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ABSTRACT
The main aims of the report are to: (1) gain a better understanding of key
economic forces shaping choices available to schools; (2) build up our practical
knowledge of how other organisations deal with the kinds of issues facing
schools; and (3) bridge the gap between the view that economics has nothing
useful to say about how to organise education and the view that education is
just another business and should be treated as such.
The report draws on analogies from the business world to highlight parallels
between the operating environment facing schools and businesses. It also
identifies some important features of schooling which do not have a strong
parallel in the business world, which suggests care needs to be taken not to
draw too much from any individual example.i
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Foreword
Do business and schools share similar problems?  If so, can any insights
be gained by examining how businesses react to them?  These questions
are the focus of this report.
Perhaps a more fundamental question, however, is why raise these
issues in the first place?  Some might assert that formal schooling is so
far removed from most business activities that there are few parallels
worthy of note.  However, it would be difficult to align such a response
with the growing overlap between businesses and schooling noted in
this report.  This growing overlap is due to an increasing diversity of
schooling approaches and greater educational choice.  The result is that
many schools now confront problems typically faced by businesses.
Likewise, the increasing importance of continuous learning and skill
acquisition while people are in the workforce, means that businesses
are confronting issues that schools have tended to tackle.
In contrast to those that assert that there is no overlap between schools
and business, others might assert that the parallels between formal
schooling and business are so strong and that schools should be run
along business lines.  However, such a stance ignores some
complexities unique to schooling which typically give rise to
government involvement.  As a result, the structure and dynamics of
formal schooling will always be much more influenced by government
interventions than most businesses.  Among other things, this is due to
the key role that governments play in almost all countries to ensure
adequate access by all sections of the community to schooling of an
appropriate quality (in particular, by making attendance compulsory
and ensuring provision at little or no cost to students who attend).
The report focuses on the performance and structure of schooling.
Government involvement in education is pervasive and therefore
shapes many observed features of schooling.  Nevertheless, we look at
underlying forces influencing school behaviour, such as how they deal
with difficulties in measuring their performance and influencing parent
perceptions of the quality of their services.  We have tried to do this by
drawing on analogies from the business world to bring into sharp focus
some strong parallels between the operating or business environment
facing schools and businesses, despite the fact that both are subject to
very different regulatory environments.
There are of course important features of schooling which do not seem
to have a strong parallel in the business world.  Care needs to be taken
not to draw too much from any individual example as some of the
underlying forces on schools interact, and the combination of them –
which is what schools in reality face - means that exact parallels cannot
be drawn between schools and any particular business or industry.
Nevertheless we believe that this report offers useful insights into the
structure and dynamics of schooling that exist whatever the specific
regulatory environment facing them.  This is important because
differences in regulatory environment may lead these forces to manifest
themselves in different ways, but these forces are nevertheless presentiii
and need to be understood by policy makers and sector participants
alike.  The report does not derive policy conclusions for the obvious
reason that identifying general influences on schooling is only one
small component of what is needed to develop policy in this area.iv
Executive Summary
The genesis of the report lies
in debate about the inherent
features of schooling that
make it different from other
activities.
This report examines how businesses deal with various types of issues
facing schools.  Its intention is to enrich the understanding of the
structure and performance of primary and secondary schools by




The government is heavily involved in schooling in New Zealand.  It is
the dominant owner of schools, with more than 87 percent of students
attending state schools.  The state also funds primary and secondary
education but funding is not uniform.  The school sector is significantly
regulated by the Education Act 1989.  The current structure of schools
and their performance thus reflects this involvement.
This report attempts to
identify the inherent features
of education and schooling
that make schools similar to
or different from other
activities.
The observed structure and behaviour of schools explicitly and
implicitly reflects the influence of government policies.  This report
identifies the intrinsic features of education and of schooling to assess
how they could affect the structure and behaviour of schools by
abstracting from the effects of government involvement in education.  It
then identifies how other businesses with similar features respond to
them in the way they are structured or the way they perform.
But the abstraction of the
effects of government
intervention for the purposes
of analysis should not be
interpreted as implying that
no or limited involvement in
schooling is an appropriate
public policy.
It should be noted that ignoring the effects of government involvement
in schooling is an abstraction.  It should not be interpreted to mean that
the absence of interventions specific to the schooling sector is an
appropriate public policy.  However, identifying parallels between
business and schools can provide insights about potential complexities
in schooling that will shape the nature of government involvement.  In
almost all countries government involvement by way of regulation,
ownership and funding of schools (with different mixes among these
instruments) is pervasive, reflecting common community values about
the importance of ensuring adequate access to schooling of appropriate
quality by all sections of the community.
Education is a service whose
inherent characteristics
affect how schools are
organised and how they
function.
The nature of a product or service can influence how it is provided.
Education is a service whose characteristics affect both the structure and
behaviour of schools.  The principal features of education are that:
• it is an investment which involves a current cost and a future and
uncertain benefit;
• it is a complex process that depends not only on the ability and
past education of the student but also on the quality of teaching;
• the needs of students are heterogeneous, and each student has
different needs and capabilities;
• the quality of the service is hard to assess before it is used and the
effects of poor teaching may only become apparent after some
years;
• education is cumulative and sequential, so that what can be
learned depends on what has been learned before; and
• education at the primary and secondary level involves children,
whose parents act on their behalf in choosing to educate them.v
Education shares some
common features with many
other services.
These characteristics of educational services are similar to those of many
other professional services such as health care or legal services.  For
example health care is an investment that can improve the length and
quality of life; the benefits of health care depend not only of the quality
of the care, but also on the patient; the needs of patients are diverse; the
quality of the service is hard to assess before use; health status often
depends on past lifestyle decisions and activities and not all patients
(such as the mentally ill or comatose) are capable of making their own
decisions about the care they need.
Schools have certain
inherent features that arise
from the nature of the
educational services they
provide.
Schools are a typical organisational form for providing educational
services.  A deeper understanding of schooling can be inferred by
looking below the surface of what is observed in schooling.  Features
such as the typical segmentation of schooling among age groups
(schools for junior, intermediate and senior students), for example, may
simply be the result of government policy, rather than an inherent
feature of schools.  Schools typically:
• involve a teacher or teachers with a number of students;
• involve long-term relationships between students, staff and the
school;
• offer qualifications and examinations;
• offer a range of subjects of instruction;
• divide students into various categories; and
• offer other services in addition to education.
The structure of schools can
be explained by the existence
of transaction costs, in the
same way that transaction
costs explain the existence of
firms.
Transaction costs are all those costs that surround economic activity and
exchange.  They encompass a spectrum including the costs of
information, of negotiation, of drawing up and enforcing contracts, of
defining and enforcing property rights, of monitoring performance, and
of changing institutional arrangements.  In short, they comprise all the
costs that are not simply the costs of physical production.  The very
existence of organisations is a response to transaction costs.  The
structure of organisations reflects their implicit objective to minimise
their total costs (transaction costs plus production costs) for a given
level of output.  The structure of schools can also be examined as a
response to the nature of transaction costs.
So how might the forces that
shape the responses of
businesses to problems they
face also find reflection in
formal schooling?
So if transactions costs affect the structure and practices of schools as
well as businesses, how might the forces that shape the structure of
businesses also be reflected in formal schooling?  These implications are
the focus of this report.  Many of the responses by businesses are
already reflected in the current or emerging structure and practices of
schools.  Others are not typically seen in the educational sector.  Some
responses, such as price discrimination used by businesses, are more
problematic in respect of schooling.  Accordingly, not all the potential
responses available to businesses are appropriate for schools.vi
Schools are a form of
organisation that economises
on the costs of co-ordination
and takes advantage of
specialisation.
If there were no schools, parents could contract with a number of
individual teachers to provide instruction to their children.  However,
searching for appropriate teachers and monitoring their quality could be
costly.  The costs of co-ordinating specialist teaching could be high, and
a generalist teacher might not have the range of necessary skills.  A
school can be a less costly alternative as it assembles and co-ordinates
the necessary educational and administrative skills to provide
educational services.  A school can take advantage of economies of scale
(teaching many students at once) or economies of scope (teaching a
range of subjects).  A school can also obtain information about the
teachers it employs and assess their performance.
The structure of schools
would be likely to be diverse.
Schools could take a number of organisational forms, from schools as
corporate entities that employ a number of teachers, to schools that
provide premises but lease them to individual teachers under contract.
There would also be  likely to be scope for individual teachers to offer
instruction to students as specialist music teachers do now.  It is difficult
to foresee which types of arrangements would be most likely to emerge.
• Hospitals such as Ascot and those run by Southern Cross both
employ staff and lease the use of facilities to service providers
such as surgeons.
A significant characteristic
of schools is that they
involve long term
relationships between
students and the school on
the one hand, and between
teachers and the school on
the other.
Schools do not operate on a ‘spot’ market.  There is a durability or
persistence in the decision to attend a school that does not involve very
frequent changes between schools.
• The purchase of a house is a durable decision, since there may be
significant transaction costs in moving.  In contrast, renting a
hotel room is a less durable decision as the transaction costs of
shifting are low.
The long term nature of
these relationships arises
because transaction costs
make frequent moves costly.
There can be significant transaction costs for both teachers and students
in moving between schools.  They are likely to arise from the costs of the
disruption of personal relationships between students and their
teachers; the disruption of learning when it is hard to find out what a
student has already learned; and the costs of obtaining information
about the quality of education provided at the new school.  Students
and teachers also acquire skills and knowledge that may be quite
specific to the school and the course of study, thus making it costly to
transfer to another school.
• The relationship between general practitioners and their patients
is often a long term one, where a change of doctor can disrupt
treatment and it may be hard for the new doctor to find out the
exact state of the patient’s health.
Education is a complex
service, making the
assessment of teaching and
school quality costly and
difficult.
Education, like many other services is an ‘experience good’ whose
quality is not easily discerned before it is used.  Measuring the quality of
schooling is difficult because it is hard to observe the ability of students
and the quality of their effort and to separate these effects from the
value added by the school.  The value added by the school in one year
also depends on what the student has learned in previous years, and
thus is potentially affected by prior teaching quality.vii
Schools use a range of
mechanisms to assure
potential students and
employers of past students
about the quality of the
education they provide.
The difficulties of measuring the quality of education provided by a
school underlies the use of a range of mechanisms to signal the quality
of the school.  The parents of potential students have an incentive to
obtain information about the quality of the school, and potential
employers have an incentive to find out the level of education of
potential employees.  The school also has an incentive to provide
information about the quality of the services it provides in order to
attract and retain students.  It is more cost-effective for the school to
provide the information because it has better information than parents
or employers about the quality of the services it provides.
Schools typically measure
educational attainment
through the use of
examinations and the award
of qualifications.
Examinations and other systems of measuring educational attainment
are commonly used by schools to measure the achievements of students.
Qualifications are granted to students on the basis of their educational
performance, and are used by them to signal their value to potential
employers.  Employers use qualifications as a cost-effective way of
finding out what potential employees know and for screening them.
Examination systems are also used as measures of what students who
are still at school have already learned, and so common curricula and
performance measures (such as examinations) facilitate the movement
of students between schools.
In cases where the majority
of students move from one
school to another, the schools
might seek to co-ordinate
curricula or adopt other
standard practices.
Vertical integration is a response to the existence of the costs of frequent
transactions.  When students move between schools (for example
between primary and secondary school) there is likely to be some
disruption to their education and the relationships they have formed
with other students and teachers.  Co-operation and the co-ordination of
examinations, curricula, school culture and teaching approach between
schools where most students move from one to another could reduce
these costs.  The relationship could involve informal arrangements at
one end and full vertical integration under a single owner at another.
Savings of other costs such as administration and marketing may also
foster greater integration.
A number of forms of
measuring performance are
likely to arise.
The information provided by measures of educational attainment is
enhanced if the measures are comparable across a range of schools and
if measurement is independent.  Schools may develop a common
system of examinations that they all use, or independent providers
could develop and administer examinations for schools.viii
Teachers have an incentive
to signal their quality to
schools as potential
employers.
Teachers know more about their ability than do schools who are their
potential employers.  This informational difficulty arises in other
employment situations, but is exacerbated in teaching because it is hard
to observe the quality of the educational outputs.  Certification is a way
of reducing the transaction costs for schools employing prospective
teachers, since it reduces the need for each to ascertain the quality of the
teacher independently.  Voluntary professional associations are likely to
emerge in order to provide quality assurance to schools through teacher
certification, as they do in other occupations.
• The New Zealand Master Builders Federation is a voluntary
registered society which registers master builders according to
strict criteria.  Registered Master Builders are subject to
recertification each year and must comply with the code of
conduct of the federation.  Membership of the federation involves
an explicit guarantee of quality to buyers of building services.
Independent organisations
are likely to rate school
quality.
Customers rarely know more about a service’s quality than the provider
of a service does, yet have a strong incentive to obtain sufficient
information about the service they intend to buy in order to make a
decision.  Independent organisations can provide information about
service quality as they do for other services such as hotels and
restaurants.  However,  the multidimensional nature of education and
the diverse needs of students may make it difficult to provide a single
measure of quality, such as a ‘star’ system.
• Qualmark is an independent rating system which is a joint
venture between the Automobile Association of New Zealand
and the New Zealand Tourism Board.  It operates a one to five
star rating system for hotels and motels.  Properties display the
rating on their properties and in their advertising and it is also
used in accommodation guides to help travellers choose where
they want to stay.ix
Schools are likely to invest
in branding by developing a
reputation for providing
educational services of a
certain type and quality.
Since a school knows more about the quality of services it offers than
students or their parents, and it is harder and more expensive for the
buyer to obtain the information, it is cheaper overall if the schools
provide information.  But the information must be credible for it to be
effective in influencing the decision of the buyer.  One way to promote
credibility is for the seller to develop a trustworthy reputation that is
compromised if the quality is not met.  Investments in reputation,
branding and goodwill are all means of providing information about
the quality of education to potential buyers, and are common in other
areas of professional services.  These tangible activities are proxies for
the unobservable quality of the education on offer.  Schools at present
face similar issues and respond by promoting their reputations.
• Legal services, like education, are intangible experience goods
and it is hard to separate the activities of the client from the
efforts of the lawyer in the legal outcome.  As a result, it is hard
for the client to discern the quality of the services provided.
Legal firms thus typically focus on the observable and tangible
aspects of their services as signals of quality, such as high prices,
expensive premises, and highly qualified, well presented and
well-spoken staff.  They also develop reputations for providing
high quality services and present themselves accordingly.
Chains of schools can
economise on the costs of
branding.  In some respects,
special character and
denominational schools
already exhibit some of these
features.
A chain could be developed with a number of schools offering standard
teaching approaches or curricula as a signalling or branding device that
differentiated it from other schools (in some respects special character
and denominational schools already exhibit some of these features).
The chain’s investment in branding would establish a reputation for a
certain quality or type of service which it could capture in repeat
business across the whole chain.  Students shifting between schools
would be likely to move to another school in the same chain, thus
displaying some ‘brand loyalty.’  The branding would reinforce the
‘lock in’ of a long term relationship to the chain, but would facilitate
movement between schools through common courses and performance
measures.  A chain could offer significant advantages to schools in
economies of scale in administration and marketing, as well as in the
development of a curriculum and common approach to pedagogy.
Chains of businesses are common in other sectors.
• The Silver Oaks Group owns and operates a chain of motor inns
which are subject to rigorous quality control.  This means that
potential patrons can be sure of the quality of the motor inn
before they make a booking.  The common quality associated
with the brand establishes a reputation that signals quality and
ensures repeat business from loyal customers.x
Schools could operate as
franchises.
Some  schools (such as kura
kaupapa) that share the same
special character exhibit
some of these features.
An alternative to a chain of schools under single ownership is
franchising.  Franchising would involve an individual school buying the
right to provide a particular type of education from the franchisor
which develops the curriculum and teaching approach to be used.  A
particular characteristic of franchises is their uniformity.  Franchising is
often preferred where firms are geographically dispersed and costly to
monitor.  Franchises are common in some service industries, such as
hotels and accounting and already exist in some sectors of education.
• Yamaha and Suzuki music schools are operated by independent
teachers (generally sole practitioners).  However, they share
common teaching techniques and training programmes.
Both for-profit and non-
profit schools might co-exist.
It is difficult to identify any specific feature of education that inevitably
leads to a non-profit form of organisation for schools.  Schools have not
always been run as non-profit organisations.  There are currently a large
number of specialist schools, such as music schools, that are run for
profit, although historically for-profit schools offered a general
curriculum.  Non-profit and for-profit forms of organisation co-exist in
other sectors such as health care and the provision of social services.
• Southern Cross Healthcare is a non-profit friendly society owned
by its 800,000 members.  It runs hospitals under a trust and a
profit-making arm runs travel and workers’ compensation
insurance.  In contrast, Ascot Integrated Hospital is a profit-
making company.
Just as transaction costs
explain how schools are
structured, they also help to
explain school practices .
Transaction costs underlie a number of the behavioural characteristics of
schools, such as the use of compatible qualifications, the grouping of
students, the provision of multiple services within the school, the
multiple uses to which school facilities can be put and the location of
schools.  Other factors that are important include economies of scale and
economies of scope.




The tendency for students to move between schools is made easier if
schools adopt compatible qualifications that reflect an agreed standard
of achievement.  A common, standardised system of examinations can
promote interaction between schools by providing information on the
educational achievement of the student and by reducing the transaction
costs of shifting students between schools.  It can also allow schools to
take advantage of economies of scale in the preparation of the
curriculum.  Three basic forms are possible: an external organisation
that franchises or sells the curriculum to independently owned and
operated schools; a consortium of schools that have a common
philosophy of education or horizontal integration to form a chain of
schools.
• The TOEFL is an example of an external independent system of
examinations that is used as a common measure of English
language proficiency.  It is an internationally recognised standard
that allows students to move between countries without having
to undergo more testing.xi
There are advantages in
grouping students together
for instruction.
Schools group students together to take advantage of economies of scale
where teaching a number of students at once is effective.  In other
circumstances, for example, piano teaching, one-on-one teaching is
more appropriate, but the costs per student are likely to be higher.
Groupings of clients are common in other businesses, where individual
attention often involves higher costs.
Schools might also try to
take advantage of the fact
that students learn from one
another.
Students affect each other, so that good students can improve the
learning of less able students, thus improving the overall observed
quality of the school.  Schools take advantage of these positive peer
effects by offering scholarships to bright students.  These peer effects
pervade service industries, which typically manage them through
differential pricing.
• Airlines typically reward customers who pay additional costs for
business or first class seats, or for ’club’ membership fees with
access to special airport lounges.  This partly reflects
opportunities to ’network’ in business lounges (ie, peer effects)
which may increase customer loyalty.
Schools tend to cater for the
diversity of student needs by
specialising in certain
subjects or approaches to
education.
Students have a wide variety of tastes and needs.  Different schools will
specialise in meeting different needs, from schools specialising in
surfing to drama.  Language, culture and religion are particularly
important in shaping the demand for specialised schooling.  Socio-
economic factors may also be important, as parents often select schools
where students are similar to their own children.  The differentiation of
goods and services by type, quality and price is a defining characteristic
of all markets, from cars to clothing.
• There are many different ways of travelling between Wellington
and the South Island.  Options include flying, or travelling by a
variety of means of sea transport.  Some modes are restricted to
freight only.  All could be expected to be of the quality demanded
by discerning purchasers.  But each mode of transport differs in
its type or characteristics.  Some enable a vehicle to be
transported, while the time taken to make a crossing varies
according to which mode is used.
Schools’ facilities might be
used in increasingly diverse
ways for longer periods of
the day.
The capital assets of schools, such as land and buildings, can be costly.
This is a typical feature of many businesses who respond, for example,
by making more intensive use of their facilities by running multiple
shifts or by leasing facilities.  Since school facilities are not highly
specialised (ie they are not highly asset specific), premises could be
leased and fitted out for schools in the same way as they are for other
businesses.xii
Schools might be used to
provide multiple services.
The provision of academic instruction is complementary to many other
activities directed at children and young people.  Schools could offer
services in addition to the core provision of education.  For example,
they could offer health care or related family social services.  These
services could be provided simply as part of the overall package of
services, or they could be provided under contract by specialists who
leased facilities from the school.  The leasing of facilities for the
provision of complementary services is common in business, for
example in shopping malls.
• Ascot Hospital both leases facilities to surgeons and consultants
(who are paid for their services by patients) and provides
accommodation and nursing care to patients.
The location of schools is
likely to reflect changes in
technology.
Schools are generally located close to a child’s home.  Like other
businesses, schools are likely to site themselves close to the demand for
their services, but demand at that location must be sufficient to justify
the provision of a service.  Technology is likely to become increasingly
important in delivering education since it can separate location from the
provision of services.  Technology is increasingly being relied on to
provide services in small or remote communities.
• Bank Direct has no branches but offers a full range of banking
services from its premises in Auckland.  Most of its customers are
high level users of technology, and a lack of physical branches
does not hinder the provision of services to this market.
While many of these
responses by schools are
common to businesses, two
features distinguish schools
from other businesses;
• the heightened difficulty
of measuring the quality
of educational services
they provide; and
• the custody of children.
While many of the above responses by schools reflect the commonality
of the issues faced by schools and businesses, schools differ from
businesses in two important respects (as always, leaving aside the more
pervasive role of the government in funding and providing for
schooling compared to other businesses).  The first is the difficulty of
measuring the quality of educational services provided by schools.  This
gives rise to systems for measuring educational achievement.  Typically
these involve a system of examinations and the granting of
qualifications in order to facilitate the movement of students between
schools.  They also provide a signal of school quality to prospective
students and to the prospective employers of graduates.
The second unique feature of schools is their custody of children on
behalf of parents, and that students between certain ages are compelled
to attend.  This feature is addressed through the provision of truancy
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1 Introduction
The genesis of this review is the debate that often occurs about the
extent to which the educational sector, and formal schooling in
particular, is inherently different from other activities.  While this is
obviously true in some ways, education is likely to exhibit many
characteristics similar to other industries.  The intention is to enrich the
understanding of education and its inherent characteristics that
determine the structure and performance of schools in an increasingly
diverse and dynamic schooling sector.
The focus of this report is on comparing and contrasting the provision
of education through formal schooling with the provision of goods and
services through firms.  As forms of organisation, schools and firms
could be expected to exhibit different characteristics in response to the
demands and constraints they face.  The provision of goods and
services through firms, and of formal schooling through educational
institutions is pervasive.  At the most general level, firms and schools
transform inputs via a process that produces goods or services.  Useful
insights can be gained by examining differences and similarities in how
these institutions respond to variations in the ‘raw material’ they seek
to transform, to constraints and opportunities in ways in which those
inputs can be ‘combined’ or processed, and to difficulties in measuring
the nature and quality of the ‘raw material’ and of the final outputs.
Variations in inputs, the quality of ‘production processes’ or the quality
of outputs alone do not give rise to contracting or incentive problems.
Difficulties arise when one party to a transaction is aware of variability
and the other party is not.  Much of this report focuses on parallels in
the commercial world where these information asymmetries arise and
how these problems are ameliorated through contracting or other
solutions.  Many of these solutions revolve around issues related to
measurement.
The report identifies potentially relevant analogies between the
commercial world and formal schooling.  This should not imply,
however, a stark dichotomy between the two realms.  Even a cursory
analysis of the education and commercial sectors indicates a continuum
between schools and businesses.  In New Zealand and elsewhere, some
schools run activities that are at the margins of commercial businesses.
Likewise, some businesses are closely involved in the provision of
education.  Accordingly, several of the business analogies highlighted
in this report span the spectrum between schooling and business as
traditionally understood.
The conclusions of the report are not intended to be prescriptive –
indeed, the complexity of the educational and commercial world is
such that prescriptive remedies to problems faced in education are
unlikely to be viable.
The report is organised as follows.  Section 2 provides a context for the
review by identifying in broad terms the current regulatory2
environment of schools in New Zealand.  This description is not
exhaustive but instead focuses on those aspects that have implications
for considering parallels between schooling and other sectors.
Section 3 outlines key characteristics of education and schooling.  This
section provides the framework for Sections 4 and 5.  Section 4 focuses
on parallels between the organisational nature of schools and of firms,
and how these reflect responses to particular problems raised by co-
ordination, long-run relationships and quality assurance mechanisms.
The focus of this section is to document the types of institutional
arrangements that have evolved in the business sector to ameliorate
problems that are similar to those faced by schools.
The focus in Section 5 shifts from how schools are organised to how
they interact with each other and with their clients (broadly
understood) to provide educational services.  In particular, we discuss
ways in which the sector has responded to measurement and agency
problems through compatible qualifications and sorting of students.
The implications of the provision of multiple services and the location
of schools to respond to client demands are also noted.  Parallels with
responses by businesses to similar measurement and agency problems
are outlined and their relevance assessed. The conclusions to the report
are set out in Section 6.3
2 The Regulatory Environment for Schools in New
Zealand
This section outlines the principal features of government involvement
in education as a background to the report.  Since the focus of the
report is identifying the inherent features of education and schools, it is
helpful to appreciate how government policies currently affect the
structure and performance of schools.
Schooling in New Zealand is characterised by a high degree of
government involvement.  The state is involved in education at two
conceptual levels, in the inputs to the educational process, and the
educational process itself.
2.1 Regulation of Inputs
Regulation of education is carried out under the Education Act 1989.
The principal features of the regulatory environment are that
attendance at a school is compulsory for all children between the ages
of 6 and 16.  The Ministry of Education sets the education requirements
for teachers, and requires that all teachers be registered.  School
buildings and the equipment they contain must meet guidelines set by
the Ministry.  In fact, the majority of schools are owned by the state, so
the nature and quality of buildings is controlled largely via ownership.
State owned schools dominate the school sector.  The extent of the
ownership interest of the state is indicated in Table 1.  In 1997, just over
25,000 or 3.5 percent of students attended independent schools out of a
total of more than 712,000.  A further 9.5 percent attended integrated
schools.  These are schools where the premises are privately owned and
the schools receive similar levels of funding for tuition, but must fund
their own capital expenditures, and are permitted to do so through
charging fees.  The predominance of state ownership of schools is a
characteristic of all OECD countries, although New Zealand’s state
ownership is particularly high.
2.2 Regulation of the Educational Process
State schools are regulated in most aspects of their operations such as
their governance arrangements, curriculum, employment of teachers,
terms and hours of operation.  Independent schools, in contrast, are
lightly regulated, but must provide facilities and services comparable
to state schools and must employ registered teachers except in
narrowly-specified circumstances.  Integrated schools are subject to
similar regulation to that of state schools.4
Table 1 - Number of Students Attending Schools, 1997
Type of School State Integrated Independent Other* Total
Full Primary 132,843 14,100 6,351 0 168,322
Contributing 210,072 6,840 0 0 216,912
Intermediate 56,168 0 98 0 56,266
Composite 12,042 3,808 11,904 0 27,754
Year 7-15 18,360 18,176 3,036 0 39,572
Year 9-15 177,790 10,166 3,580 0 191,536
Special Schools 1,774 0 80 157 2,011
Correspondence
School
9,903 0 0 0 9,903
TOTAL 618,952 68,118 25,049 157 712,276
* Consists of schools in Social Welfare Institutions, Homai Vision Education Centre, and
Glenburn.
Source: Ministry of Education
The state has a substantial financial investment in education as
indicated in Table 2.  The Education Act 1989 gives every child between
the ages of 5 and 19 the right to a free education at a state school.  The
meaning of ‘free’ is not defined in the legislation.  Schools receive
funding via the Ministry of Education from general taxation.  The level
of funding is determined by the type, class, location and size of school
that students attend.  Funding is not uniform.  In general, state schools
receive more public funding per student than integrated schools which
get more funding than independent schools; smaller schools get more
funding per student than larger schools; and low decile (with low
socio-economic status) schools receive more funding per student than
higher decile schools (although almost all of this difference is
accounted for by higher per-student operations grants rather than
differences in the funding of teachers’ salaries or school facilities).
Partial additional funding is available for students who are more
difficult to educate.











1 234 63,358 1,173 2,307 6,059
2 224 60,197 1,048 2,450 5,980
3 237 70,440 943 2,415 5,558
4 220 72,747 936 2,507 6,143
5 210 67,816 873 2,582 5,735
6 218 62,009 891 2,585 5,911
7 220 56,957 864 2,681 6,065
8 228 62,686 799 2,340 5,494
9 219 53,049 752 2,191 5,379
10 231 80,421 721 2,273 5,689
TOTAL
/AVG 2,241 649,680 896 2,430 5,808
Source: Ministry of Education
State funding does not reflect the real resources available to schools.
For example, boards of trustees are not funded for the management
services they provide; nor do state schools face the cost of capital,
which is met separately by the state.
Funding is provided to schools under the categories of ‘operations
grants’, ‘salaries’ and ‘land and buildings’.  Staffing levels at many state5
schools are set according to a predetermined formula (central
resourcing), while directly resourced schools receive predetermined
levels of funding to meet the costs of teachers’ salaries but have the
discretion to decide the mix and numbers of teachers employed.
2.3 Regulatory Features of Schooling
The level of government involvement gives rise to a number of features
which characterise schooling in New Zealand.  Some of the more
obvious ones are listed below:
• most independent schools that offer the ‘core’ curriculum are not
for profit, although there are a number of specialist schools that
operate for profit, for example teaching music or swimming;
• the curriculum taught by both independent and state schools is
largely similar, although state schools can tailor the curriculum
within regulatory guidelines to their own needs;
• there is little specialisation among schools, and most schools
attempt to cater for a diversity of needs among students within
the school;
• all state schools and most independent schools use the state
system of examinations and qualifications.  There is very little
use of external examinations in the core curriculum, although
external examinations are used in areas such as music; and
• schooling is compulsory, so students are legally required to
attend school;
The business sector offers services that have characteristics that in
several respects are similar to education, and the structure of firms and
their behaviour is influenced by these characteristics.  The remainder of
this report identifies business analogies that can be used to explain how
inherent characteristics of education influence the structure and
performance of schools.6
3 Education and Schools
The focus of this report is on the performance and structure of
schooling, and how analogies from the businesses world can be used to
predict and explain how the inherent characteristics of schools affect
they way they are organised and how they behave.1  The role of the
government in the education sector is pervasive as shown in the New
Zealand context discussed briefly in Section 2, and strongly influences
the observed organisational structure and performance of schools.
Therefore imagining how schools the inherent characteristics of schools
affects their structure and performance involves two issues.
The first issue is related to the service provided by schools.  It involves
identifying the nature of education and its demand characteristics.
This issue is important because the nature of the service can influence
how it is provided.  For example, petrol retailing is driven by a demand
for transportation and a derived demand for fuel for motor vehicles
which means that petrol retailers are conveniently located along major
roads, often in conjunction with other motor services such as vehicle
repairs.  At the same time, economies of scale and transaction costs lead
to vertical integration in the industry and strategic co-operation among
competitors in the use of facilities such as refineries.
The second issue is how schools are organised to provide the service,
and how lessons can be drawn from businesses about they way they
function.  We thus distinguish between education (the service) and
schools (the form of service delivery).  Each has different
characteristics.  For example, education is widely thought to have some
public benefits in addition to the benefits to the individual student,
although they can be hard to measure.  Schooling produces a different
type of public benefit from the effects of peers on each other since
students who learn together often teach each other.  Although schools
are the predominant form of delivering formal primary and secondary
education, we acknowledge that education more broadly involves
significant informal and self-directed learning.
The major role of the state in education worldwide is relatively recent.
Two hundred years ago, children in Europe and the United States were
predominantly schooled by church schools, private tutors or by private
schools.  The institution of state schooling however has spread over the
last two centuries.2 Over the last 150 years the state has become the
major supplier of schooling worldwide.  The state not only provides
schools, but also provides funding for schooling and regulates
education.  The pervasive phenomenon of government intervention in
schooling raises several questions.
First, why does education typically take place in schools?  In other
words, what are the forces at work that make the school the preferred
organisational form for delivering education?  Most of these forces arise
in the presence of imperfect information about the quality of education
and uncertainty about student ability and future employment
prospects.3  The school may be seen as an efficient arrangement of7
contracting between parents and teachers for the delivery of
educational services to students.
The second question is related to the conduct of schools toward one
another.  What are the forces that drive schools to co-operate and co-
ordinate their activities on the one hand and to compete with each
other on the other? State schooling systems are often characterised by
centralised administrative systems that limit the scope for decentralised
decision-making, foster a perception of uniformity (such as a
standardised curriculum) and limit the forms in which competition
among schools occurs.4  In the absence of regulation, however, it is
likely that schools would function much like other businesses that
strategically co-operate where it is in their interests to do so, but
compete in other circumstances.
To address these issues we must identify the inherent characteristics of
education that affect both the structure and behaviour of schools.  The
principal characteristics of education and schools are set out in Figure
1.
Figure 1 - Characteristics of Education and Schools
Education Characteristic Schooling Characteristics
Investment Curriculum and subjects
Complex Teachers and students
Heterogeneous Specialisation and grouping
Measurability Qualifications and examinations
Cumulative Long term relationship
3.1 Characteristics of Education
The characteristics of education that we consider to be relevant in
helping to explain the nature and behaviour of schools are its
investment nature, its complexity and cumulative nature and problems
of measuring its quality.  In addition, the students who are an input
into the process of education are highly heterogeneous.  Of course,
education has many additional characteristics that are important in
other contexts.  For example, parents may not act in the best interests of
their children in ensuring that they receive an education.  However,
this is an issue for government intervention rather than the structure
and behaviour of schools.
Education is an investment.  Like many activities, education is an
investment which involves a cost in the present and an uncertain future
payoff.  The payoff occurs not only from the content of what has been
learned, but also from the process of education itself, which makes it
easier for educated students to learn new skills and tasks in the
workplace.  The enhanced knowledge and skill gained from education
is valuable to the student.  It can enhance his or her employment
prospects and lifetime welfare.  There are also intangible benefits which
can be termed ‘participation in society’ that arise from a broad
understanding of subjects such as history, geography and science.  The
benefits of education create a demand for learning that students (and
their parents) consider to be relevant and valuable.  The expected
payoff to education will affect the demand for both the type and8
duration of education, and will be affected not only by the quality of
the education received but also by the supply and demand for the skills
acquired.  The expected benefits of education determine to a large
extent what is taught.  While mastery of core areas such as the ‘3 Rs’ is
a necessary foundation at the primary school level for further learning,
more applied subjects are offered towards the end of secondary
schooling.  Education itself offers consumption benefits.  That is,
students can enjoy learning quite apart from the instrumental value of
what they learn.  This consumption can drive the demand for certain
types of educational activity such as sport, especially at the senior
secondary level.
Education involves children.  Education is not independent of the student.
Education typically (but not always) involves children who cannot be
relied on to make rational decisions about their future.  Parents
generally act on behalf of their young children to ensure that they
receive an education in order to reap the future benefits.  The demand
for education therefore arises from parents.  Part of the demand for
schooling may also be driven by the custodial services offered by
schools.
Education is complex.  The process of education is complex, and its
quality depends not only on the ability of the teacher, but also on the
ability, aspirations and background of the student.  Importantly,
education occurs to varying extents through informal learning activities
often carried out in the home.  The benefits of learning therefore arise
not only from formal schooling but also through the time, effort and
money that parents and other family members invest in their children.
These factors are often influenced by a culture and its attitude toward
learning.  The process of learning is thus complex, and it is hard to
separate the marginal effect of formal education from other learning
activities.  Education is also influenced by peer effects, since students
can learn from one another.  So, educational outcomes are a function of
multiple inputs, only one of which is school or teacher quality.  Also,
education is multidimensional and covers a wide range of subject areas.
Parents and individual teachers are not generally equipped to teach the
range and depth of all the subjects demanded by students.  Education
therefore typically involves the interaction of a student with several
teachers.
Education is heterogeneous.  As noted above, students differ from one
another in ability, family background, educational achievement and
aspirations.  Parents and students display a wide range of preferences
about education.  Some may prefer traditional methods and subjects,
while others may prefer a more liberal approach.  Each student has
different learning needs.  Some may require remedial teaching while
others may need more advanced opportunities for learning.  A wide
range of educational services is required to address those needs, and so
education is very diverse.  At the same time, it is difficult for schools to
deal with such heterogeneity among students.  Customised one-on-one
teaching is costly.  As a result, schools both specialise in serving niche
markets such as gifted children and group students together in classes.9
The quality of education is hard to measure.  An important result of the
complexity and heterogeneity of education is that the quality of
education is both variable and hard to measure.  It is hard to measure
not only the intellectual endowment and prior educational attainment
of the students, but also the quality of the educational process and the
educational outcome.  It can be hard for students and their parents to
measure the effectiveness of teaching and its contribution to the
education of the student.  Even so, parents seek information about the
quality of the education provided by schools and schools have
incentives to signal their quality.  Examinations and qualifications are
mechanisms for doing this.
Education is cumulative and sequential.  What a student learns depends to
a large extent on what has been learned before.  For example in
studying Shakespeare, the ability to read is important.  Mastery of
calculus depends on a good knowledge of basic algebra.  Schooling
therefore typically takes place in the context of a long term relationship
between the student and the teacher or school where teaching builds on
what has been learned before.
It should be noted that some of these characteristics are not unique to
education.  They occur in other professional services such as health care
and law.  For example:
• health care is an investment that can generate a payoff in terms
of improved quality and length of life;
• health care is complex, and depends not only on the services
provided by the professional, but also on the patient’s own
behaviour and previous state of health;
• patients are heterogeneous in their needs;
• the quality of health care is hard to assess before it is used; and
• health status depends to a large extent upon prior behaviour and
health care decisions.
This resemblance suggests an immediate analogy between education
and other professional services in the market, structure and
performance of their organisational arrangements.  However,
government regulation may distort these arrangements (for example
prohibitions against multi-disciplinary practices in law) and reduce
their usefulness as analogies.
3.2 Characteristics of Schooling
Just as the process of education has certain characteristics, so too does
schooling possess certain characteristics that influence schools’
organisational form, the way that schools function and the market
environment in which they operate.  It can be too easy to infer that
schools have certain characteristics, just because they are commonly
observed.  What is observed may simply be the consequence of
government policy.10
The following characteristics of schools therefore describe briefly what
is typical about schools.  They arise largely from the characteristics of
the educational services that schooling provides.  Once we have
identified the essential features of schools, it is then possible to identify
what makes them what they are.  Their organisational form and the
way that they function can then be compared with other firms which
may have similar characteristics in Section 4, and the way that they
function in Section 5.
3.2.1 The Structure of the School
The structure of a typical school has a number of features which arise
from the characteristics of education:
Schooling involves a teacher(s) each with a number of students.  A school is
an institution that offers educational services to students.  The parents
or guardians5 engage the school to provide education, while the school
employs teachers to instruct the students.  A school typically involves
one or more teachers and a number of students but in very small
schools, there may be only one teacher.  It differs from tutoring because
it typically does not involve one-on-one learning.  Teachers generally
teach many students at once in a classroom setting.  Although some
learning may be self-directed, especially at a senior level, most
schooling involves both teachers and students.  This characteristic of
schools arises principally because of the complexity of education, since
a single teacher cannot typically cover the range of subjects required by
students, particularly at the secondary level.  In fact, many parents who
home school their children through the primary years send them to
secondary school, at least in part for this reason.  The school as a nexus
of relationships between parents, students and teachers is discussed in
Section 4.3.
Schools involve long term relationships.  Schools typically enrol students
for a long period, generally for at least a term, but often for several
years or even a student’s entire school career.  They also engage
teachers for long-term contracts of at least a term.  The long term nature
of the school relationship between students and teachers arises because
of the cumulative and sequential nature of education.  The long run
relationships that are characteristic of schools are explored in Section
4.4.  The sequential nature of learning means that it can be difficult for
students to shift easily between schools.  Examinations are one way of
obtaining information about the educational attainment of students
that makes it easier for them to transfer between schools.  The
mechanisms used by schools to co-operate and facilitate movement
between them are  discussed in Section 5.2.
3.2.2 The Market Behaviour of Schools
Schools offer qualifications and examinations.  Schools typically offer their
students qualifications to indicate their level of educational attainment.
Often they do this through external examinations that are also common
to other schools.  Examination systems and qualifications are a
response to the difficulties of measuring the quality of education.  They11
also provide a signal about the quality of the services offered by the
school, but are an imperfect measure of performance because they do
not separate the effects of the natural ability and previous educational
attainment of the student.  The use of examinations as one of a range of
quality assurance mechanisms used by schools is discussed in more
depth in Section 4.5.2.
Schools offer a range of subjects.  Schools generally offer a range of core
subjects, such as language and mathematics, together with more
specialist subjects from the bagpipes to Arabic.  The curriculum offered
by schools reflects the demand for education which derives from its
expected benefits.  The range increases at the secondary level, whereas
primary schools typically focus on core subject areas.
Schools divide students in various categories.  Schools typically divide
students into different groups, generally on the basis of ability and past
educational achievement.  Although students are very heterogeneous,
there can be economies of scale in grouping students and teaching
them together.  Classrooms are a defining characteristic of schools,
even expensive private schools.  There are additional benefits of
teaching students in groups because they can learn from one another
directly and indirectly.  The tendencies of schools to group students are
explored in Section 5.3.
Schools offer many services.  Schools can serve a custodial function.  Most
schooling involves students who are taught away from their homes.
Schooling also typically, but not always, involves children or
adolescents, and teachers are in loco parentis.  Part of the demand for
schooling may therefore be derived from the benefits that they obtain
from being temporarily relieved of the custody of their children by the
school.  The multiple services provided by schools are discussed in
Section 5.4
3.3 Variation and Measurement
The characteristics of education and schooling are important in
determining both the organisational form and market behaviour of
schools.  The most important of these are that education is
heterogeneous and complex, but the effects are hard to measure.
Educational outcomes differ for each student, yet are hard to control as
they are affected not only by the quality of the inputs, but also by the
process of schooling itself.
The structure and performance of schooling can be viewed as a
response to the existence of this inherent variability.  The principal
sources of variation are shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2 - Sources of Variation in the Schooling Process
Factors Sources of Variation
Exogenous Factors (Inputs) Prior educational experience
Intellectual endowment
Parental values and expectations
Endogenous Factors (Process) Quality of education inputs
Individual effects
Peers12
The principal input into the schooling process is the student.  The
quality of this ‘raw material’ depends on the child’s intellectual
endowment or native ability.  The greater that ability, the easier it is for
the child to learn, and the greater his or her educational achievement,
all other things being equal.  It is affected by the child’s prior
educational experience as well.6  Both these factors are measurable
sources of variability in the quality of the outcome of education,
although actual measurement may be difficult.  Parents are likely to
know more about factors such as natural ability, motivation and
personality than teachers are, at least at the outset.
A more complex factor is the value that parents place on education.7
This factor is fundamentally important yet inherent and unmeasurable.
Parents who value education are likely to invest time and effort in
encouraging pre-school children to learn the alphabet and sign their
names for example.  They are also likely to take an ongoing interest in
their child’s achievements and to support the teaching efforts of the
schools by supervising activities such as homework.
The process of education is complex, and depends on the interaction
between the student and school.  Schooling quality depends on the
quality of the teachers, the curriculum, physical plant, class size and the
teacher’s knowledge of the prior educational attainment of the student.
It is hard for parents to obtain information about the quality of these
factors, and schools are likely to know more about them and their
effects on education than parents.  As a consequence information on the
school’s contribution to educational attainment is not easily verifiable.
Each student responds to teaching and learning differently.  Even
students with identical backgrounds and abilities will have differing
responses.  Students are also affected by the behaviour and abilities of
other students.
Schooling simultaneously provides an academic outcome, custodial
services, socialisation and interaction as well as signals about the ability
or social status of the student.  All of these outcomes are hard to
measure separately, let alone together.
Other forces are also at work.  Economies of scale are important in
determining how schools group students together in classrooms for
instruction and are also related to the optimal size of schools.  The
impact of these forces on schools are examined in the remainder of the
paper.
The variation in educational outcomes, and the inherent difficulties of
measuring the value added by schools and separating that from other
influences on educational outcomes is a profound factor in schooling.
The difficulties of measuring the contribution of each of these sources
of variation in educational outcomes underlies a good deal of the way
that schools are structured and behave.  For example, the adoption of a
system of standardised qualifications is a response to the problem of
information about the student’s prior educational experience.  At the13
same time examinations and the qualifications of students can be used
to signal the quality of the school to prospective students and their
employers.  These effects are explored in more detail in Sections 4 and
5.
3.4 Conclusion
Education is a service whose inherent characteristics affect how schools
are organised and how they function, since the nature of a product or
service can influence how it is provided.  The principal features of
education are that:
• it is an investment which involves a current cost and a future
and uncertain benefit;
• it is a complex process that depends not only the ability and past
education of the student but also on the quality of teaching;
• the needs of students are heterogeneous, and each student has
different needs and capabilities;
• the quality of the service is hard to assess before it is used and
the effects of poor teaching may only become apparent after
some years;
• education is cumulative and sequential, so that what can be
learned depends on what has been learned before; and
• education at the primary and secondary level involves children,
whose parents act on their behalf in choosing to educate them.
These characteristics of educational services are similar to those of
many other professional services such as health care or legal services.
For example health care is an investment that can improve the length
and quality of life; the benefits of health care depend not only of the
quality of the care, but also on the patient; the needs of patients are
diverse; the quality of the service is hard to assess before use; health
status often depends on past lifestyle decisions and activities, and not
all patients (such as the mentally ill or comatose) are capable of making
their own decisions about the care they need.
Schools have certain inherent features that arise from the nature of the
educational services they provide.  Schools are a typical organisational
form for providing educational services.  It can be too easy to infer that
schools have certain characteristics, just because that is what is
observed, whereas they may simply be the result of government policy.
Schools typically:
• involve a teacher or teachers with a number of students;
• involve long term relationships between students, staff and the
school;
• offer qualifications and examinations;
• offer a range of subjects of instruction;
• divide students into various categories; and14
• offer other services in addition to education.
These features of schooling arise from the inherent characteristics of
education.  Both the structure of schools and the way they function are
largely determined by the transaction costs of providing educational
services.  An important factor that determines these transaction costs is
that education is variable and the quality of educational services
provided by schools is hard to measure.  The organisational nature of
schools is explored in Section 4, while the performance of schools is
examined in Section 5.15
4 The Organisational Nature of Schools
4.1 Introduction
The way in which schools are structured is a response to the nature of
the educational services they provide.  Education involves transaction
costs for both providers and consumers.  Of particular importance is
the fact the education involves a complex process in which the student
is an essential input, so that the value added by the school is hard to
assess.  This feature makes identifying potential providers, negotiating
the transaction and monitoring the results costly.  Schools respond by
devising a range of ways to assure the quality of the services they
provide, such as the formation of chains and franchises as discussed
below.
This section explores the ways that the inherent characteristics of
schools affect their structure by abstracting from the effects of
government involvement.  Of course, it is hard to envisage what does
not currently exist, so that businesses which deal with similar situations
are used as analogies from which the structure of schools can be
inferred.
It should be noted that this report does not evaluate the desirability of
the structures which might emerge.  Rather, the emphasis is on
exploring the range of organisational forms that would be likely to
arise by drawing lessons from existing business structures.
4.2 The Transaction Cost Approach
The firm is often at the heart of how buyers and sellers of goods and
services arrange their affairs.  The economic analysis of the firm has
centred on two important questions; is the firm a substitute for the
market, and why does the structure of the firm vary?  The answers to
these questions emphasise that the firm involves a set of contracts
between the owners of inputs and that it replaces market exchange
with a hierarchy.8  The firm acts as an intermediary between the inputs
required to produce goods and services and the buyers of the goods.
For example an entrepreneur contracts with a labourer to provide a
specified type and quality of labour for a certain period in return for a
given payment.  During the period of the contract, the ability of both
the labourer and the entrepreneur to vary the contract in response to
future events is limited by the terms of the contract.  The contractual
relationship between the labourer and the entrepreneur substitutes
management for a spot marker in labour.  This form of relationship
continues for as long as the expected benefits exceed the expected costs.
They arise because each party seeks to economise on the costs of
interaction with one another.  In this example, it is likely to be more
costly for the entrepreneur to negotiate a new contract with a different
labourer each day, when it is hard to measure beforehand the quality of
the work, when there is some skill acquired from learning on the job
and labour is required each day.  These aspects of the contract are16
known as transactions costs, and arise principally from the frequency
of transactions, the asset specificity involved (such as the skill required
to do this particular job) and the uncertainty of future events which can
affect the contract.
The existence of transaction costs underlies the structure of schools in
much the same way as it explains the existence and structure of firms.
Transaction costs are all those costs that surround economic activity
and exchange.  They encompass a spectrum including the costs of
information, of negotiation, of drawing up and enforcing contracts, of
defining and enforcing property rights, of monitoring performance,
and of changing institutional arrangements.  In short, they comprise all
the costs that are not simply the costs of physical production.
Transaction costs are ubiquitous and significant, and involved in any
organised activity.  The very existence of organisations is a response to
transaction costs.  The objective is to minimise their total costs
(transaction costs plus production costs) for a given level of output.
Individuals make conscious choices to arrange their affairs in ways that
deliver the greatest net benefits to them, and so try to reduce the costs
of transacting with one another.  The transaction cost approach has
been used to explain the existence and variation of a wide variety of
organisational forms, from firms to department stores, franchises and
share contracts.9
The structure of schools can also be examined as a response to the
nature of transaction costs.  Williamson suggests that institutional
arrangements arise from the characteristics of exchanges which give
rise to three critical sources of transaction costs: asset specificity,
uncertainty and frequency.10 These sources of transaction costs are
examined below as ways of explaining why schools have the structures
they do, and how they are similar to or differ from other forms of
business organisation that have similar types of transaction costs.
4.3 Co-ordination and Specialisation
Parents typically make decisions on behalf of their children in sending
them to school.  This relationship in which parents act on behalf on
their children can be seen in economic terms as an implicit ‘contract’
although it is recognised that there is of course no such explicit
contract.  Parents can generally be assumed to be acting in what they
perceive to be the child’s best interest.  It must be recognised that
parents sometimes do not act in the interests of their children, as
evidenced by child abuse and cases of neglect.  It is notable that despite
the fact that the net value of education is well recognised, it is
nowadays almost universally the case that education is compulsory, at
least at the primary school level, although there was, for example a
high demand for schooling in Great Britain in the 18th and 19th
centuries, (before the advent of compulsory elementary schooling in
1880), that was met by the private sector.11
Parents can choose to provide these services themselves within their
own home.12  By doing so, no educational contracts are needed, and a17
demand for educational institutions does not arise.  Yet schools do
exist, and not all parents elect to educate their children at home.  The
question is, why do schools exist and take the form they do?
Even if parents do choose to provide educational services to their
children within their own home, they may seek the skills of educational
specialists for a number of reasons:
• they do not possess all the skills necessary to educate their
children;
• while they possess the skills, they can purchase the educational
services of the specialist at a lower cost than the parent’s after-tax
opportunity cost of time;
• the educational specialist is likely to be more effective than the
parent would be;
For example, parents may seek the services of a music teacher if:
• they do not have the musical skills themselves;
• they can employ a music teacher at a lower opportunity cost than
doing it themselves; or
• they may consider it simply too ineffectual to attempt to teach
their own child music.
The result would be an educational contract between a parent and an
educational specialist, but it would not give rise to school
organisations.  The three way contracting relationship is shown in
Figure 3.  The parent (on behalf of the child), contracts with a teacher to
teach the child.
Figure 3 - Three Way Contracting
However, contracts between a parent and an educational specialist,
such as the music teaching example above, create a number of
problems.  First, the parent has difficulty ascertaining the quality of
each potential music teacher before entering into the contract, although
it is easier to find out after lessons have begun.  Even so, teachers
themselves have an incentive to provide information to parents and
their students.  Individual music teachers signal their quality to parents
through their reputations, their own music qualifications and the
performance of their students in external music examinations such as
Trinity College and concerts performed by students which parents
attend.  Second, once a music teacher has been selected, the teacher
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must be encouraged to act in the best interests of the parent and
student.  Faced with these problems, what does a parent do? Asking
friends about teachers could filter out teachers with a poor reputation,
but is costly in terms of time and effort.  A long-term contract could be
useful to allow the parent to find out the quality of the teacher over
time.13  However, this solution is also costly because while it could
assist in the future selection of music teachers for younger children,
time has been lost with the first child’s musical education.
A school is an alternative that reduces these costs.  Parents contract
with a music school to provide musical instruction to their children as
shown in Box 1.
Box 1 - The Yamaha Music School
The Yamaha Music School provides for a method of learning to
play the piano which defers the need to learn to read music until
the student can play tunes.  The school caters for beginning ages
of 4-6 years old and provides tuition for a maximum period of 4
years.  The school is open to children of any ability who wish to
learn to play the piano.  Numbers are not sufficient to warrant
streaming of children by ability.  There are generally 8-12
children in each class of different levels.  Parents play an active
role in the child’s learning by being required to attend training
sessions.
Teachers are recruited through advertising or referrals from
current teachers.  Applicants are initially considered though
qualifications and then subjected to a thorough selection process.
Current teachers have either a Bachelor of Music or a Royal
College of Music Diploma.  Referrals have historically been for
students from the College of Education who have training in
teaching.  At the initial interview, applicants are tested for
singing and piano playing ability.  Applicants then attend a 3-
day introductory seminar where they are observed for
communication and teaching skills.  Applicants are then
encouraged to observe classes over the following few months
and then attend another and final seminar before being selected
and beginning to teach soon after.  Following selection, any
teacher who fails to meet expectations is given specific attention
in an attempt to remedy problems.
The school only incurs the costs of gathering references on potential
music teachers once, thus avoiding the inefficiency of every parent
engaging in this exercise.  It can also observe the measured
achievement of teachers it employs.  A school can therefore reduce the
costs to parents of obtaining information about teacher quality.  The
relationship is shown in Figure 4.  Under a school arrangement the
school has an incentive to monitor the quality and performance of
teachers and to establish a reputation for providing high quality music
tuition overall as discussed in Section 4.5.6.  Parents are therefore likely
to select a school based on its reputation.19
This pattern of choice is similar to other services from hairdressers to
doctors.  Groups of professionals co-ordinate their activities and brand
themselves to signal the quality and availability of their services to
prospective clients.  But the actual quality can only be ascertained once
the service has been provided – education, like medicine and
hairdressing is an ‘experience good’.  Actual teaching quality depends
on the particular teachers that students learn from.  Parents will
monitor the performance of individual teachers and attempt to change
them if the quality of instruction is unsuitable.
The transaction costs of search are not the only factors that determine
the existence of a school.  Economies of scale are also likely to affect the
organisational form of instruction.  In music tuition economies of scale
may be limited.  It may be feasible to learn some types of music, such as
choral singing in a group situation, but other types of music, such as
piano, may require individual attention from the teacher.  As a result, a
mix of arrangements is likely to arise that includes private individual
tutors as well as schools.
Figure 4 - A Hierarchy of Contracts
The transaction costs of co-ordination and the benefits of synergy are
also likely to lead to the development of schools of music.  This is likely
to be especially true at more advanced levels of instruction, where
students expect to be trained for a career in music and require training
in various aspects of music such as performance and theory, often
across several instruments.  In these schools instruction is likely to
involve a combination of individual and classroom instruction, as
appropriate.  Specialist schools such as these are likely to focus on
music and also offer instruction in core subjects such as language and
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mathematics, thus reducing the transaction costs to students of
attending conventional school and receiving specialist music training.
Another reason that schools exist is that the hierarchical relationships
provide one party with formal control of both sides of a transaction.
This is useful where it is difficult to contract regarding all aspects of a
transaction, and it is desirable that a single party be able to deal with
unforeseen circumstances and to evaluate performance.   In the above
example, the Yamaha Music School has control over both the provision
of musical education services and the purchasing of musical tuition
from teachers.  Thus, purchase and sale of this service has been
internalised within an organisation so that the management of the
school could, for example, arrange for a refund of fees to the customer
in the case of gross non-performance of duties.  While such central
control has these advantages of providing flexibility in contracting
through internalisation, it does have costs.  It often gives rise to a taxing
behaviour, where the central control implicitly pursues an equity
objective.  Less able music teachers are likely to be subsidised in subtle
ways by more able music teachers.  Business experience indicates that
central control works best when there is homogeneity of demand, and
therefore homogeneity of product or service.  Where a product or
service must be tailored to the particular needs of customers, central
control is likely to be less efficient than decentralised control closer to
the customer.
Music is obviously not the only aspect of education.  Parents could
arrange their child’s education by purchasing a range of activities from
different teachers or schools.  They could separately buy sports
coaching, language tuition, computer-based mathematics tuition,
careers advice, music or dance lessons.  While such an approach to
schooling is not impossible, and in some sense parallels that of parents
who choose to ‘home school’ their children, it is not common.  Co-
ordinating these multiple arrangements can be very costly.
Schools are an efficient response to the problem of co-ordination.
Schools assemble the educational skills of both generalists and
specialists together with administrative skills to provide parents with
an educational package for their children.  There are likely to be several
reasons for this:
• schools provide economies of scale since the organisational cost
of co-ordination can be spread across many children, rather than
across a single family or child;
• there are additional economies of scale because a single teacher
can supervise the learning of many students simultaneously;
• schools provide economies of scope, since it is relatively
inexpensive for them to offer a range of educational courses or
programmes from a common infrastructure;
• parents may not possess the skills necessary to assemble an
appropriate education for their children;
• schools may have bargaining power in purchasing educational
inputs at a lower cost than a parent could; and21
• schools as specialists can monitor the quality of their suppliers
more readily than parents.  Thus, parents are able to simply
choose a school, and leave the school to manage the quality of
various inputs.
Schools therefore arise for the same reasons as firms do, that is, to
economise on  the costs of co-ordination and to take advantage of
specialisation.14  Schools which do not have the usual apparatus of
teaching, such as classrooms, are nonetheless schools since they carry
out these functions.  The Correspondence School, as much as any other,
co-ordinates teaching and other inputs to provide education services to
students.  In certain circumstances, this can lead to the development of
‘virtual schools’ (see the discussion of school location in Section 5.5).
4.4 Long Run Relationships
A significant characteristic of schools is that they involve long term
relationships between students and the school on the one hand, and
between teachers and the school on the other.  Teachers are slow to
move from one school to another, even when doing so would increase
their salaries.  Employee turnover rates are around 10 percent for both
primary and secondary schools, which is significantly below
benchmark turnover rates for both public and private organisations.15
Parents are reticent to move their children from one school to another,
even when doing so would reduce fees or increase educational benefits.
These long-term relationships are similar to those of a firm which may
have long term contracts with suppliers of inputs, as well as with
buyers of the goods and services it produces.  This type of
organisational structure can be contrasted with the ‘spot’ market where
labour is hired on a daily basis or where goods are sold to buyers who
may never return.  Clearly schools do not operate like this.  The
question is, why?
There is an element of durability or persistence in the decision to attend
a school, just as there is, for example, in buying a house.  A person does
not shift houses every day in response to changes in the relative price
of houses.  The consumption of education can be said to be path-
dependent.16  There is an intertemporal relationship between the
decision today and the decisions of yesterday.  This phenomenon is
extremely common and arises because of the presence of transaction
costs and because some of the inputs to education cannot be adjusted
readily.
There can be significant transaction costs for both teachers and students
in moving between schools.  These costs are likely to derive from
factors other than asset specificity.  In particular, they are likely to arise
from the costs of obtaining information about the quality of education
and the extent of past education.  Parents must assess new schools and
teachers, and schools must assess the past educational level of students.22
4.4.1 Personal Relationships
Transaction costs also arise, potentially, from the direct and indirect
costs of disruption of the personal relationship between students and
teacher, or between teachers, and of the learning process.17  These
personal relationships are a part of schooling that can be very valuable
to both students and teachers.
Primary and secondary education is a human process that generates
inter-personal relationships that can be valued by both students and
teachers.  Students spend a significant portion of their waking day with
their teachers, and do so five days a week.  It is possible that students
who attend a school spend more time interacting with their teachers
and school friends than they spend interacting with their parents.
Similarly, they interact significantly with other students.  Bonds formed
between students or between student and teacher at school can last a
lifetime.
Moving between schools can be costly for students who have to leave
their friends and make new ones.18  As a result, parents may choose not
to shift their children, even if they would be better off educationally, or
as well off, but for lower fees.  Similarly, a teacher may choose to
remain at a school even if moving to another school were to provide
greater remuneration for similar work, or similar remuneration for
preferred work.
4.4.2 Information about Past Learning
Changing schools disrupts learning.  The capacity of a student to learn
depends crucially on his or her past education because education is
sequential and cumulative.  When students change schools, the new
school must find out what they already know in order to teach them
effectively.  But it is hard to assess the quality of the student’s past
education and it can be costly for the new school to test each student
individually.
There are two possible responses to this problem.  The first is simply
that students shift between schools less often than they would between
other activities that do not have unobservable cumulative effects, such
as say, sports.  Holding sprint trials is easier than assessing what a
child knows about history, for example.  Another is that schools have
an incentive to co-ordinate their activities in order to facilitate
movements of students between them.  All schools stand to benefit,
being potentially both sources and destinations of students who move.
Standardisation of teaching into ‘units’ can be helpful in determining
what a student has already been taught.  Another mechanism to reduce
the costs of information is a system of examinations.  The difficulties of
moving between schools and the disruption to learning that results is
most evident when students move internationally where these co-
ordination mechanisms do not exist.
Professional bodies routinely facilitate the movement of professionals
between countries through co-ordination agreements which recognise23
equivalent standards of education and experience (see Box 2).  These
arrangements are typically multilateral rather than bilateral, enabling
movement between a number of countries.  A countervailing pressure
in professional bodies, however, is that entry standards are used as
barriers to entry by foreigners.
Similar problems arise in fields such as medicine where health status
can be complex and even a full medical examination by a doctor may
not reveal all the relevant information.  It is therefore common practice
for patients who move between general practitioners to have their
notes transferred with them, facilitating the information gathering of
the new doctor.
Box 2 - Institute of Chartered Accountants
Gary Smithson completed an Honours Bachelor of Accounting
Science at the University of South Africa before taking up
employment with an accountancy firm in South Africa.  After
fulfilling the practical experience requirement he obtained
membership as a Chartered Accountant with the South African
Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA).  Gary immigrated to
New Zealand shortly after and sought membership with the
New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants (ICANZ).  Gary
found membership streamlined as a result of a reciprocal
arrangement between the South African and New Zealand
Institutes.  To qualify for membership with ICANZ Gary was
simply required to successfully complete two university courses,
covering the country-specific regulatory environment; Company
and Partnership Law and Taxation and Estate Planning.
4.4.3 Information about Educational Quality
The quality of the educational services offered by schools and teachers
is hard to discern.  It is a fundamental feature of education that
explains a great deal about how schools are structured, and how
schools, teachers and parents behave.
The problem of measuring educational quality is important in
explaining the persistence of long term relationships in schooling.
Although parents typically try to find out about the quality of a school
before enrolling their children, once enrolled it may take some time to
determine how well the school teaches their children.  Of course,
because each student is unique, the perceived quality of the teaching
also varies: what suits one student may not suit another.  Also, the
effects of bad teaching may be cumulative and long term, so they may
not become evident for a long time.  As a result, bad teaching may not
be immediately evident with the result that parents may not move their
children to another school even if the move would be better for them
educationally.  Another reason that parents may be reluctant to move
their children is that although one teacher may be bad, each school has
other teachers as well who may be better.  Because of the other24
transaction costs of moving schools, parents may put more effort into
moving their children to another teacher within the same school.
Once parents have established that their children are at a good school,
they may be reluctant to move them to another school where they do
not have good information about the quality of teaching because of the
educational risks to their child.  The trust that parents have in the
quality of education offered by the school can create a long-term
relationship with the school.  Parents may decline to move house, just
in order to continue their child’s education at a good school.  Students
who attended a good school will often also send their own children
there.
The problems of measuring the quality of other services also give rise
to long-term relational contracting.  For example, a person may
continue to use the services of an auto mechanic even after moving
across town from the mechanic’s neighbourhood or a significant
increase in the mechanic’s charges simply because he or she trusts the
mechanic to provide good service.  Generally, this relationship lasts as
long as the benefits to the customer outweigh the cost and
inconvenience of using this particular mechanic.
Another reason why parents are not responsive to changes in the price
of schooling is that, because it is hard to measure educational quality,
parents may presume that ‘dearer is better’.  In other words, price is
presumed to be a proxy for quality.  It can also signal to others the
wealth and status of the parents.  This attribute of education is by no
means unique.  Part of the value of luxury goods such as cars, jewellery
or designer clothes is their ability to signal superior wealth.  The price
of schooling can increase its value to parents and students if it places it
further out of reach of those with lower net worth.  However, this
raises wider issues, outside the scope of this report, concerning the
importance of ensuring adequate access by students from all
backgrounds to quality schooling.
4.4.4 Asset Specificity
Asset specificity is a relatively weak explanation of long term
relationships in schools, although it is a powerful factor in determining
the structure of some firms.  It is probably less important than other
transaction costs arising from uncertainty.
It could be argued that long-term contracting is a result of asset
specificity; that the human capital built up within the school is specific
to particular contracts and, as a consequence, is specific to particular
relationships.  As a result, teachers and parents are unwilling to
withdraw from these contractual relationships because the value of this
human capital would be dissipated by doing so.
Williamson’s approach measures asset specificity as the loss in asset
value on separation of assets.19  For example, assume V denotes the
combined value of assets relevant to a contractual relationship, and VA
and VB denote the go-alone values of assets controlled by the
contracting parties, A and B.  Asset specificity can be denoted as V –25
(VA + VB), which is a synergy concept.  This synergy is a common
attribute of a business, since it is in fact this synergy or asset specificity
that forms part of the explanation as to why firms exist.  We evaluate:
• the extent to which asset specificity is observable in school
organisations;
• the nature of asset specificity;
• how asset specificity explains school organisation; and
• rational responses to asset specificity, as illustrated in businesses.
Separable assets comprising a school include the human capital of
teachers and students, land, buildings, classroom furniture, educational
aids, and other equipment.
Human Capital of Teachers and Students
Using the Williamson-style asset specificity definition above, it
becomes evident that a teacher’s human capital is not highly asset
specific.  While a teacher’s human capital is specialised and significant,
its value as part of a particular school is not significantly different from
its value if separated from the school.  The salaries teachers receive are
not likely to reduce significantly if they transfer to another school, for
example, even though  some aspects of the teacher’s human capital
may be specific to the school, such as knowledge of individual students
and community norms.
Other professions are similar in this respect.  An accountant, for
example, is likely to develop considerable human capital by
specialisation within a professional accounting firm.  However, these
specialist skills, and their value, can be transferred to another
professional accounting firm with minimal loss.  That is not to say that
there are no transaction costs associated with leaving a firm and joining
another, but that the transaction costs do not arise out of a diminution
in the value of human capital.
Even so, teachers may develop specialist skills or knowledge about a
particular community that may take time and effort to replicate in
another school.  There may be some work asset speciality, but it is
unlikely that the specific human capital of teachers is a robust
explanation of the long-term relationships that exist in schools.
Students also acquire human capital through their schooling.  They
obtain skills, know-how, relationships and knowledge that may be
quite specific to the school and the course of study.  This asset
specificity may make it difficult to transfer to another school if it is not
easy to pick up a new course of study.  There may therefore be a form
of ‘lock-in’ to a particular school (or system of schools with a common
curriculum) that accounts for the long-term nature of schooling
relationships (see Section 4.4).26
Land and Buildings
The most valuable physical asset of a school in monetary terms is the
land and buildings.  Both can typically be put to alternative uses
without reducing their value substantially.  However, these values
could be significantly reduced in some cases.  For example, if rural
schools were to close, it might be difficult to put buildings to alternate
uses of similar economic value.  Thus the value of the school (V) is
likely to exceed the stand-alone value of its parts, VA and VB.
In such cases of asset specificity, the potential for ‘hold-up’ arises, a
problem that is clearly not unique to schools.  The nature of the hold-up
problem is as follows.  If an input is supplied by one entity to another,
and the supplier has had to invest in resources that are partly or fully
unique to that contractual relationship, then that supplier is vulnerable.
The purchaser can take advantage of the fact that the supplier’s
investment is now ‘sunk’ and is therefore irrelevant for decision-
making.  The purchaser could, in the absence of contractual or other
constraints, force the supplier to price inputs at close to their marginal
cost, ignoring the sunk investment.
Opportunities for such behaviour in school contracts are not plentiful.
For example, it is unlikely to arise in contracts between a teacher and a
school, since a teacher’s human capital is unlikely to be highly specific
to a contract with a particular school, as noted above.  However, the
value of land and in some circumstances buildings can be highly
specific to its use by a particular school.  Imagine a rural school with
significant investment in permanent buildings.  Imagine that the
population of school-age children in that geographic region has
diminished since the school was built.  Imagine also that the next-best
use of the school buildings has a very low economic value.  The
resources are essentially sunk and are therefore irrelevant to whether to
continue operating the school.  Thus, the community can validly point
out that it is economically viable to retain the school, since the benefits
obtained from keeping the school open exceed the unavoidable costs.
In this way, the asset specificity problem has led to a situation where it
is rational to operate the school, even though the total costs of
operating the school exceed the benefits.
However, asset specificity alone is not sufficient to give rise to the ‘hold
up’ problem, as Williamson explains:20
“Of several dimensions with respect to which transactions differ,
the most important is the condition of asset specificity.  This has
a relation to the notion of a sunk cost, but the organisational
ramifications become evident only in an inter-temporal,
incomplete-contracting context … a condition of bilateral
dependency arises when incomplete contracting and asset
specificity are joined.
The joining of incomplete contracting with asset specificity is
distinctively associated with TCE [transaction cost economics].
This joinder has contractual ramifications both in general and
specifically with reference to corporate financing.”27
As discussed earlier in relation to the music schools example, a long-
term contract is one mechanism for addressing this problem because it
places costs on the party taking advantage of ex-post contracting
uncertainty.  Loss of reputation is an example of such a cost.  If all
outcomes or ‘states of the world’ could be contracted for, both parties
could protect themselves against being taken advantage of as a
consequence of the sunk nature of investment in specific assets.
However, if contractual or relational solutions to this potential problem
are not viable, then another solution is to form a hierarchy in which a
single party is able to deal with both parties to a contract, if necessary
modifying the contract after the fact to deal with unforeseen
circumstances.  This is part of the explanation why firms exist.
Business analogies for dealing with this asset problem abound.  For
example, contractual issues associated with providing services in rural
areas where those services require sinking significant capital into
physical plant are clearly not unique to schools.  For example, forestry-
related services are capital intensive and demand for these services
varies significantly through time and can potentially cease.  Similar
issues arise with mining-related services and services allied to large
civil engineering projects.  Contractual solutions are likely to be
sufficient in very few of these cases, due to the complexity of the
contracts.  However, in the case of a large civil engineering project it
may be possible to contract for the duration of the project, so that
neither party can take advantage of the other half-way through the
fixed-term relationship.  The repeated nature of these contracts and the
resulting importance of reputation can act as a constraint on asset
specificity-related problems.  A solution that is observed with some
frequency is the enfolding of both parties to the contract into a single
hierarchy, as Box 3 illustrates.  Although this example involves a
government organisation, the provision of housing by firms operating
large projects of long term duration in remote areas is common.28
Box 3 - Twizel
The Electricity Division of the Ministry of Energy commissioned
a significant investment in hydro-power generation
infrastructure in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s.  This generation
investment centered on a network of lakes, canals and power
stations in the Lake Tekapo, Lake Pukaki, and Lake Ohau area.
As with all investment in electricity generation at the time, the
Ministry of Works was commissioned to undertake these
projects.  Because of the length of time over which this work took
place, and because of the number of workers required, a
considerable amount of additional housing was required in the
Mackenzie Basin in South-west Canterbury.  It is conceivable that
this housing could have been provided by organisations that
specialised in providing residential housing, with Ministry of
Works contracting with such an organisation for the provision of
housing.  However, such contracts were not entered into,
perhaps because of their potential complexity.21  Instead,
Ministry of Works assumed control of both sides of this contract
for provision of accommodation by building the entire town of
Twizel, which remains to this day, despite the end of electricity
development work in this area.
The above example provides a potential explanation for why a single
organisation is often the owner of significant inputs to the educational
process, as well as owners of the school organisations, and significant
purchasers of educational services.  This presumably allows contracts
to be varied ex post to deal with unforeseen outcomes.  Note that the
single organisation need not be a government body.  It could be a co-
operative of parents, for example.
However, contractual, relational and organisational solutions are
second-best to avoiding the problem in the first place.  This can be done
by converting highly specific assets into generic assets.  For example, a
firm could use relocatable plant or prefabricated, relocatable buildings.
The firm could design plant in such a way as it has alternative uses.
This solution is also demonstrated by the Twizel example above, where
almost the entire town was designed to be relocated by road.  Box 4 is a
more recent example from the timber industry.29
Box 4 - Blue Mountain Lumber
Blue Mountain Lumber operates a sawmill in Southland.  They
require additional steam to increase their timber’s value-added
component through kiln drying.  However, their shareholder
views the provision of steam as outside Blue Mountain Lumber’s
core activities, and wishes to purchase steam as it would any
other service, thus precluding common ownership as a potential
solution.  Meridian Energy is negotiating to provide steam to
Blue Mountain Lumber by installing, owning and operating a
boiler at Blue Mountain Lumber’s premises.  However, Blue
Mountain Lumber is unwilling to provide a guarantee to
purchase steam over a significant portion of the boiler’s life, thus
precluding a long-term contracting solution.  Nor are they
willing to underwrite the investment in any way.  In summary,
Meridian Energy is investing in assets that are unique to its
contractual relationship with Blue Mountain Lumber.  The
combined value of the sawmill and boiler (V) exceeds the stand-
alone values of the sawmill and the boiler, VA and VB.
The way Meridian Energy intends to protect itself from hold-up
problems is essentially to convert a contract-specific asset into a
generic asset, as follows:22
• The boiler is designed to operate on any biomass fuel, and
can also be operated on coal.
• All components of the boiler and its installation are modular
and can easily be designed into other boiler applications
• Each modular component has been designed to facilitate
relocation by road transport.
• The boiler is an outdoor, all-weather installation, so that it
does not require a building around it.  A concrete floor slab
is all that would be left in the event of boiler relocation.
• An easement has been registered on the title to Blue
Mountain Lumber's land, for the purpose of eliminating
legal impediments to Meridian Energy removing its boiler.
Meridian Energy plans to enter into between 10 and 20 similar
contracts, so that they can redeploy Blue Mountain Lumber’s
boiler to another customer’s site.
Application of the above business analogy to schools is
straightforward.  If a school’s owner wishes to ensure that investment
in a school’s resources will always be put to their best economic use,
then in the absence of contractual solutions to potential ‘hold-up’ it is
desirable to avoid investment in highly specific physical assets.23  Thus,
a school may be set up with a portion of its classrooms being easily
relocatable if a significant lowering in enrolment is possible.  In the
extreme, if demographics could change such that a school may
subsequently not be viable in a region, then it may be sensible to build
a temporary school.  It may in fact be rational to do so even if this
alternative were to cost more than building a permanent school.  Note
that Meridian Energy will spend more on the Blue Mountain Lumber
boiler than they would if they were to install a permanent boiler.30
We readily acknowledge the limitations of such analogies.  In the above
analogy, the quality and volume of steam provided by a relocatable
boiler is no different from that of a permanent boiler.  This may not be
the case when comparing relocatable and permanent schools.
Education quality may differ, as might the perception of quality.24
In brief therefore, it is unlikely that the physical assets of schools are
highly specific to the supervision of education.  School buildings
typically can be put to other uses.  However, school land and buildings
may be specific to education in some locations, especially in remote
areas where alternate uses are not plentiful.  In these cases a ‘hold-up’
problem could arise that is typically dealt with by firms owning all the
inputs rather than contracting.  An alternative solution to this problem
is for firms to ensure that assets are generic rather than specific and so
can be used in other activities or locations.
4.5 Quality Assurance Mechanisms
Measuring the quality of schooling is difficult and costly.  Not only
does the quality of teaching vary, but the impact of poor teaching may
only be revealed many years later.  Measuring the quality of schooling
is difficult because it is hard to observe the ability of students and the
quality of their effort and to separate these effects from the value added
by the school.  The value added by the school in one year also depends
on what the student has learned in previous years, and thus may be
affected by prior poor teaching.  Measuring school quality is costly not
only for the sellers, but also for the buyers.  These measurement costs
are important in explaining the organisation of the market for
education.
Because measuring the quality of education is difficult and costly, a
range of mechanisms arise which reduce the costs of doing so.  It is
hard to measure the quality of education, since it is intangible, varies
from student to student, is not readily observable and the effects of
education are cumulative and long-term.  As is the case with other
contracts, it is generally the party that can most influence the variability
of quality who bears the cost of that variation.25  In other words,
schools, rather than parents, will devise ways of signalling their
quality.  These measurement difficulties also affect the market
behaviour of schools, as discussed in the next section.
4.5.1 Variation and Asymmetric Information
The outcomes of many services vary.  The variation arises not only
from the variability of the quality of the service provided, but also from
the variability of the inputs into the process.  At the same time, buyers
and sellers have different information about the underlying attributes
of the inputs and the service.  The existence of variations in the
outcome, the asymmetric information of the buyers and sellers and the
transaction costs of obtaining information give rise to a number of
different ways of generating information about the quality of inputs
and services.  These range from pre-testing of inputs by sellers (where
buyers know more about their own inputs into the outcome than the31
service provider) to the use of branding and reputation (where the
seller knows more about the quality of the service than the buyer).  The
nature of these information asymmetries in the presence of variation
and their implications for devising quality assurance mechanisms are
explored in the remainder of this section.
Imagine, for example, a landlord seeking to renovate a badly damaged
residential rental property.  The landlord seeks the services of a
building contractor, who uses his own skills and those of
subcontractors to renovate the property.  It is clear that the building
contractor is able to influence the quality of the finished dwelling to a
far greater extent than the landlord is able to.  This is the variation
problem.  Also, the builder knows more about his or her abilities and
motivations than the landlord.  This is the agency problem arising from
asymmetric information about the quality of the builder’s services.
In the absence of transaction costs, it is economically rational for the
landlord to sell the dwelling ‘as is’ to the building contractor.  The
contractor will then renovate the property for himself, thus bearing the
variation in quality of the finished dwelling.  The contractor can then
sell the property on an open market, and the landlord can purchase
that property or some other property, where the dwelling’s quality is
largely observable.26  Yet we do not commonly see this as a solution to
the information problem, as the transaction costs are high.
Other mechanisms arise in order to overcome the problems of variation
and asymmetric information.  A more common solution to the problem
is for the building contractor to invest in establishing a good reputation
in order to provide information to the landlord about the quality of the
services offered, to offer a guarantee or to become a member of an
association, such as the Master Builders’ Federation that acts as a
guarantor of the quality of the services offered by its members.  It is the
builder, and not the landlord, who makes the investment in signalling
quality (See Box 10).
Variation in outcome quality can also be constrained by generally
agreed and observable standards of work.  For example, a person may
seek the services of a gib-stopper to bring walls and ceilings of a
dwelling to a paint finish.  In such circumstances, the variation in
inputs becomes much more important than variation in outcome, and
the nature of the information asymmetry changes.  The gib-stopper
knows more about how much work is required than the owner does
even though it is their dwelling.
Personal services display the same problems of asymmetric
information where quality is variable and are exacerbated where the
quality of the service cannot be discerned beforehand.  Such services
are  ‘experience goods’ where using the service (such as medical care or
a restaurant meal) reveals its quality.27  In contrast, it is relatively easy
to find out the quality of ‘search goods’ such as clothing.  Education is
clearly an experience good.
Information asymmetry regarding input quality is the inverse of that
exists in schooling.  It is the parents who is likely to know more about32
some aspects of their child than the teacher does and the student may
know more about what he or she has already learned elsewhere than
do teachers at a new school.  In contrast, the provider of gib-stopping
services knows more about the ‘quality’ of a dwelling’s walls and
ceilings than the owner is likely to know.  This is a subtle but important
distinction regarding the nature of information asymmetry involving
schooling inputs.  Not all information asymmetries are the same.  Not
only does it matter whether the supplier or the customer has superior
information, but it also matters whether the asymmetry is about the
customer’s or the supplier’s contribution to the contract because:
• multiple information asymmetries exist within schooling, and
each needs to be analysed separately; and
• business analogies involving information asymmetries need to
be chosen carefully so that they actually match the schooling
information asymmetry being analysed.
To illustrate this, consider how a dwelling’s owner would deal with the
information asymmetry above; that the gib-stopper knows more about
the state of the building’s interior than does the owner.  The owner can
use competition in the market for gib-stoppers to effectively side-step
this information asymmetry.  The owner would obtain quotes from a
number of gib-stoppers, thus leading the gib-stoppers to compete away
their information advantage.  Of course, this solution is of little benefit
in contracting for schooling services, for two reasons.  First, there is
seldom a commonly agreed-upon standard to which the outcome of the
educational service must attain.  Second, not all school-related
information asymmetries are characterised by superior knowledge on
the part of the service provider.
Three information asymmetries are immediately evident in schooling:
• the parent knows more about endogenous inputs to the
educational process, such as
- the child’s past educational experience;
- the child’s intellectual endowment;
- the parent’s values regarding education;
• the teacher knows more about their ability than their employing
school does; and
• the school organisation knows more about the quality of the
schooling they provide than a parent, student or employer does.
These information asymmetries are categorised and illustrated in
Figure 5.  The first of these information asymmetries can be placed in
the top-left cell, while the second and third information asymmetries
can be placed in the bottom-right cell.33
Figure 5 - Information Asymmetries
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The costs of the variation in the quality of schooling due to poor
teaching are borne by the student.  If teaching is substandard, then the
lifetime returns to education are reduced.  The student also bears the
costs of his or her own lack of ability or effort.  At issue is how the
variation in the educational outcome of the student due to information
asymmetry can be reduced.  In particular, what responses to similar
information asymmetries arise in analogous businesses, and are they
applicable to schools?
The examinations and qualifications which characterise schools can be
viewed as an attempt to measure educational attainment in response to
the problems of variation and asymmetric information.  In particular,
they provide information to a student’s new school on what they have
learned at the previous school, thus reducing the need for individual
pre-testing.  This feature of examinations is discussed in Section 4.5.2.
Vertical integration of schools can also be viewed as a response to the
transaction costs that arise with frequent transactions where there is
uncertainty about the inputs, as discussed in Section 4.5.3.  The
certification of professionals as a signal of their quality to potential
employers is a common device in many occupations and is likely to
occur in teaching even without government intervention as discussed
in Section 4.5.4.  Rating organisations are frequent in a range of34
industries as a means of providing information to potential buyers
about service quality, especially for experience goods.  The
applicability of rating to schools is explained in Section 4.5.5.  Suppliers
of services have a strong incentive to invest in reputations and
branding (see Section 4.5.6).  Warranties and guarantees are common
devices for suppliers to signal service and product quality to buyers
altogether they may be less applicable in education (see Section 4.5.7).
The use of chains of schools and franchises are mechanisms for using
branding to signal quality to buyers (see Section 4.5.8.  and 4.5.9).
4.5.2 Examination System
Pre-testing is an obvious means of dealing with information asymmetry
regarding a child’s educational experience and intellectual endowment.
It is commonly used in the provision of personal services, such as
medicine or fitness training (see Box 5).
Box 5 - Nick Tongue
Nick Tongue is a New Zealand representative swimmer.  Part of
his training routine is a thrice weekly workout at a gymnasium.
To ensure he exercises in a manner conducive to maximising his
swimming ability he employs the services of a personal trainer.
The personal trainer cannot know Nick’s physical condition prior
to Nick approaching the trainer.  Nick is therefore subjected to
certain physical tests before the trainer constructs an exercise
programme.  Pre-tests include the measurement of cardio fitness,
fat content, baseline strength and flexibility.  Once Nick’s current
physical shape is ascertained and his target and goals are
specified the personal trainer can implement the most suitable
exercise programme.
Further tests are carried out during the course of the training
period to compare physical attributes to those when he began
using the programme.  This verifies the effectiveness of the
training programme and Nick’s physical ability to the exercises.
Nick works for a swim school to help fund his travel expenses to
competitions.  Acting as an instructor himself, Nick faces the
same problem as his personal trainer in that he has no
knowledge of the ability of a potential swim student.  Nick must
evaluate the current ability of newcomers to the school by means
of pre-testing.  Students are tested for swimming ability by visual
examination of their techniques and/or by an assessment of
speed.  Students are then sorted into streams of individuals with
similar abilities.
Individual pre-testing can be used when the attributes being tested,
such as vision, heart-rate or fitness, can be observed or discerned easily
and cheaply (see Box 6).  However, its usefulness depends on how
precisely it can measure what is being investigated.  In medicine, for
example, patient examination may not be completely effective in
revealing all the relevant information.  It is therefore typically35
supplemented by taking a history from the patient directly or by
accessing the notes of previous doctors.  The achievement or ability
measured by examinations may be only a proxy for actual ability or
achievement and may or may not be systematically related to the actual
value.
Box 6 - Broadway Eye Clinic
The Broadway Eye Clinic operates in Vancouver, British
Columbia, offering corrective treatment for those who are
shortsighted.  They use a computer-controlled laser to reshape a
patient’s cornea so that glasses or contact lenses are no longer
required.  Most of Broadway’s business comes from the United
States, with patients travelling across the border into Canada.
Providing such services in Canada avoids or mitigates certain
regulatory and litigation impediments.  The correction required
will affect the cost of the treatment, since people who use very
high-powered corrective lenses may require two treatments.
Treatment cannot commence without accurate information about
the state of the patient’s eyesight which is tested prior to the
procedure.  Of course, this is necessary to quantify the exact
nature of the myopia and astigmatism so that co-ordinates can be
correctly entered into the computer.
The educational needs of students differ widely.  They depend on the
natural ability and past educational achievements of the student, and
on the market for the skills acquired by education.  Less able students
may require remedial courses, while more able students may require
extension classes.  The way that students learn is also a factor that must
be taken into account.  The needs of a blind student, for example are
somewhat different from those of sighted student.
Schools have a strong incentive to respond to the heterogeneous
demand for their services.  They could do so by offering a wide variety
of programmes and methods of teaching or by specialising on a
particular style or area of teaching such as drama, music or
mathematics.  Having a number of diverse providers is likely to be an
effective means of meeting the range of needs of students.  This is a
typical business response to meeting the diverse needs of consumers.
The student’s investment in education results in a future payoff in the
form of enhanced earnings.28  The fact that education is valuable
undoubtedly drives its demand.  The payoff arises not only from the
substance of the education that has been acquired, but also from the
signalling (or ‘sheepskin’) effect of the qualifications.29  Yet, given the
diversity of the demand for educational services, the quality of the
education provided by schools is also likely to differ.
Because it is hard for employers to obtain information about what or
how much the potential employee knows, they use the qualification as
a proxy.  This is because the educational achievement of an employee is36
an experience good, rather than a search good.30  Employers generally
find out how much an employee really knows once he or she is
employed.  The quality of search goods can be established by
inspecting them before buying, but the quality of experience goods can
only be determined by actually using them.   Clothing is a typical
search good, but many personal services, such as hairdressing or
medical services, are experience goods.  Although the employer could
test the employee on all the dimensions of knowledge acquired at
school, such testing is likely to be costly and it is cheaper to rely on the
qualifications which the school has an incentive to provide.  At the
same time, the employer may find it worthwhile to test particular
attributes that are important for the job.  For example, a librarian might
be expected to have a certain level of literacy.31  Employers also obtain
information on other important intangible aspects of the employee,
such as personality or attitude to work, from checking with referees.
The attributes of education are multidimensional, complex and not
readily observable.  It can be costly for a school to find out just how
much a new student or a student transferring from another school
knows by individual pre-testing.  A standardised test could be used
that provided comparable results across students.  Each school could
therefore set its own tests.  However, the costs of developing such tests
could be high for an individual school.  Development costs are one of
the factors encouraging the use of common tests across schools,
especially if the tests are used to reveal how a student is performing
relative to the population.  A common set of standards for testing
would reduce the costs of setting tests and the information needed
about prospective students.  A corollary could be the development of a
common curriculum on which the students were examined.  A
common programme of instruction and examination would offer
significant economies of scale, particularly to small schools.  A common
examination system would provide information about students
entering a school and facilitate movement between schools among
schools that were both sources and destinations of receiving students
A common examination system and curriculum is thus a response to
the problem of asymmetric information.  As discussed in Section 5, it
underlies the tendency of schools to simultaneously co-operate with
one another by offering broadly similar courses of instruction and to
compete with one another by offering diverse courses.
A range of different organisational structures to provide examinations
and curricula are possible.  A specialist external organisation could
develop that offered these services to schools on a commercial basis;
schools could co-operate with one another on a voluntary basis;
franchises could emerge or chains could form.  External examinations
have historically been more highly valued by students and employers
than internal examinations conducted by the school because they offer
an objective assessment of educational achievement that can be
compared across schools.
Independent systems of examinations are not currently common in the
schooling sector in New Zealand.  However, the international
baccalaureate examination is used by some schools in New Zealand37
and its availability is marketed to potential students as a signal of the
confidence of the school of the education it offers (see Box 7).
Box 7 - International Baccalaureate
The International Baccalaureate or IB, a diploma course for 6th
and 7th formers, is an internationally recognised pre-university
qualification.  Established in 1965 as the International Schools
examination Syndicate (ISES), the IB provided a common
curriculum and university entry credentials for geographically
mobile students, enrolled at international schools.  The IB proved
popular as a standardised qualification that was widely accepted
by universities internationally.
Consequently, it evolved from its original purpose, as a service to
the international community into a program that could be
integrated into national education systems.
The IBO is a membership organisation and provides curriculum
and assessment development, teacher training and information
seminars, electronic networking and other educational services to
participating schools.  In return, schools pay a yearly
subscription of over $10,000.  IB candidates themselves are faced
with fees of over $700.
A small number of independent secondary schools offer the IB in
New Zealand with a significant minority of senior students in
those schools electing to follow the program instead of 6th Form
Certificate and Bursary.
External examinations are more common in specialist subjects such as
music (for example the Trinity College examinations) and English as a
second language (see Box 25).  They are however commonly used in the
USA, where special examinations such as the Scholastic Aptitude Test
(SAT) must be passed in order to enter university.  Admission to
graduate school is based on the GRE (see Box 8).
An important feature of these external tests is that they are both
independent of the school (and thus overcome any inclination that the
school may have to inflate the grades it awards) and a common
measure of educational performance, allowing comparability across
students.38
Box 8 - Graduate Admissions Tests
The Graduate Record Examination or GRE is a group of
standardised tests used by many graduate schools as a part of the
admissions process.  Candidates are required to sit the exams at a
central administration centre in their town or city.  As all
students take the same tests regardless of examination centre, the
results provide a standard measure and the performance of
students from any university can be accurately assessed.
Similarly, the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT)
measures general verbal, mathematical and analytical writing
skills and is designed to help graduate business schools assess
the qualifications of those who seek admission to study for an
MBA or into another advanced business/management
programme.  GMAT scores are used in some way by more than
1,500 graduate management programmes around the world.
4.5.3 Vertical Integration
The vertical integration of firms is typically explained as the response
to the costs associated with frequent transactions.  It is common in
many firms such as manufacturers which might integrate with
suppliers of components as well as with distributors of the product in
order to economise on the costs of negotiating and monitoring the
quality of the inputs and services provided (see Box 9).
In the education sector students typically move between schools at
different stages.  They may move from pre-school to primary school to
high school for example.  In some cases, the majority of students will
move from one school to the next.  Most students from a particular
primary school, for example, might attend the local high school.
As discussed above, there are significant disruption costs in changing
schools.  These disruption costs are especially significant if the schools
are very different in their culture, courses of instruction and approach
to teaching.  In addition, as described above, it is necessary for the new
school to find out what the student already knows in order to
determine the course of teaching.  A common examination system is
one response to this problem, and can allow students to move between
schools with some ease.  The intangible costs of disruption can also be
eased when students move between schools that are broadly similar in
their curriculum and teaching philosophy.  As a result, one observes
students from preparatory schools moving on to similar high schools.39
Box 9 – Fletcher Challenge
Fletcher Challenge Building is an example of a mature vertically
integrated business.  Quarries supply material to the plants
operated by the aggregates business, which will supply some of
its product to the cement mills.  While a large amount of concrete
in the form of cement and ready-mix concrete will be distributed
to 8 customer service centres in New Zealand by the company's
bulk cement vessel, a proportion of product is kiln fired to
produce paving, masonry and pipes.  Products from the Concrete
as well as the Steel and Building Products business units are
distributed through the company's 3 wholly owned retail chains,
Placemakers, Scott Panel and Hardware and The Building Depot.
Fletcher Challenge Forests is moving closer to vertically
integrated operations with increased expansion into downstream
processing of logs.  Traditionally an owner and manager of
timber assets, Fletcher Forests is increasingly moving away from
its core business as a commodity producer, harvesting and
delivering logs.  In an attempt to ride out the peaks and troughs
of the commodity cycles, company focus is turning to adding
value to the resource and producing a wide range of high value
solid wood products.  Of course, further vertical integration
within the group is achieved through Forests' supply of timber to
the Building and Paper businesses.
Vertical integration is a response to the transaction costs that arise
when students change schools, and most students graduate from one
school as new entrants into another.  Schools that transact with one
another frequently in this way are likely not only to adopt common
examination systems, but also to co-operate and co-ordinate their
activities in order to reduce the costs to students of educational
disruption when they change schools.  Various degrees of integration
are likely to develop from informal co-ordination, to formal agreements
and, with full vertical integration, to single ownership.  Vertical
integration can allow the schools to economise on other costs such as
administration, branding and marketing.  Vertical integration can also
offer advantages to high schools which can lock in demand from
students at primary school level by facilitating their entry into the high
school.
4.5.4 Teacher Certification
Another information asymmetry shown in Figure 5 is that teachers
know more about their ability than their potential employer does.  This
is not particularly different from a large number of labour market
transactions, but it is exacerbated in teaching because it is hard to
observe the quality of the educational outputs.  Solutions observed in
business include:
• reliance on academic or trade certification;
• applicant personality or aptitude testing;40
• reliance on referees;
• trial employment periods; and
• signalling via attire, or education.
Certification is a way of reducing the transaction costs for schools
employing prospective teachers, since it reduces the need for each to
ascertain the quality of the teacher independently.  Voluntary
professional associations are likely to emerge in order to provide
quality assurance to schools, but they also frequently seek government
regulation of the industry, purportedly to enhance quality but also to
create barriers to entry (see Box 10).32
Box 10 - Master Builders Federation
The New Zealand Master Builders Federation is a voluntary
registered society, and represents all Registered Master Builders.
Registered Master Builders are required to meet strict criteria in
order to become members and then must continue to maintain
the criteria, as they are subject to recertification each year.  In
addition Registered Master Builders must comply with the Code
of Conduct of the New Zealand Master Builders’ Federation.
The status of ‘Registered Master Builder’ is valued by those
builders who meet the criteria, as it gives them a competitive
edge.
Registered Master Builder s provide a 5 year guarantee for
residential work.  The claims ratio to date has been low.  The
Master Build guarantee provides clients with 3 distinct benefits:
• That should the Registered Master Builder be unable to
complete the works the company will appoint a replacement
Registered Master Builder and will if necessary contribute
up to 5 percent of the original contract price, if there is any
price differential to complete the works.
• That should any materials fail prematurely within the 5 year
guarantee period, they will be remedied promptly.
• That should there be any defective workmanship it will be
rectified.
Source: http://www.masterbuilder.org.nz
Teacher certification is a cost-effective way for teachers to provide
information to potential employers about their quality (see Box 11).
Teacher certification is thus likely to continue in the absence of
government intervention.41
Box 11 - Teacher Registration
The Teacher Registration Board was established in 1989.
Previously the Department of Education had administered a
register of Teachers under the Education Act 1964.  Registration
is a mechanism for the Director General to remove unsuitable
teachers.  Registration for all teachers was made compulsory in
1989, and was then made voluntary in 1991 following a review of
education agencies.  Nevertheless, a large number of teachers
remained members, suggesting that the profession saw
registration as valuable.  A reimposition of compulsory
registration in 1997 saw membership increase by only 11 percent.
4.5.5 Rating Organisations
The third information asymmetry, that the school organisation knows
more about its quality than the parent does, is again not uncommon in
business.  Customers rarely know more about a service’s quality than
the provider of a service does, yet have a strong incentive to obtain
sufficient information about the service they intend to buy in order to
make a decision.  At the same time, sellers have an incentive to
communicate the quality of what they offer.  It is more efficient for
sellers to provide the information that they have to potential buyers
who do not have it.  It is cheaper overall for sellers to provide
information than for buyers to seek it.  Service providers demonstrate
considerable creativity and diversity in means of signalling their
quality.  Of course, poor quality service providers may choose not to
take actions that reveal their type, but this very inaction is a signal.
League Tables
Parents typically have less information about the quality of educational
services provided than the school.  Yet they have strong incentives to
obtain such information, often from ‘league tables’ which rank schools
according to their external examination results.  These league tables are
often published in newspapers.  Commercial firms commonly provide
this type of information to prospective university students.  These
books are widely available in the USA and provide information such as
the ranking of law schools in the ‘Top 25’, and the earnings differentials
that accrue to qualifications from different universities.
This information, however, does not necessarily convey information
about the quality of the educational services provided by the school
because any educational outcome depends not only on the performance
of the school, but also on the natural ability and home circumstances of
the student.  Schools which may appear to be performing well on the
basis of examination results may simply enjoy the benefit of having
students of high ability.  In contrast, a school that has poor examination
records may be performing well, given the poor natural ability of the
students.  Schools generally do not like to be assessed solely on these
rankings and consider that they should not be used as a measure of42
school or teacher quality because they take no account of differing
abilities on entry.33
Yet the tables are often widely reported in the media and schools that
are poorly ranked continue to feel cheated.  Demand for the
information conveyed in the tables suggests that it will continue to be
supplied.  Given the antipathy of schools to this sort of comparative
information, it is likely to be collated and supplied by independent
organisations, rather than the schools themselves.  The information is
likely to comprise data that is publicly available, such as examination
results or obtainable by means of surveys of students or employers,
such as earnings data for university graduates.  A New Zealand
example is discussed in Box 12.
Box 12 - A Guide to 300+ NZ
Last year a publication entitled A Guide to 300+ NZ came under
sharp criticism from the rector of St Thomas of Canterbury, a
school which ranked as one of the lowest in New Zealand with 7
percent for A Bursary.  Brother Walsh commented that not only
does the result achieved by each school make no allowance for
the value added, with no mention of the percentage of Form 3
intake sitting external exams, but neither does it state the number
of students involved at each school.  Consequently, schools with
relatively small rolls find themselves with a situation whereby
each student represents a high share of the percentage total.
Brother Walsh, highlighted another commonly stated
shortcoming of league tables when he observed that, ‘If we
halved the number of students we let enter the exam, we would
double our percentage pass, but this would reduce the number of
students who would qualify to go to university.’
Value-Added Testing
Although examinations are a commonly used device for assessing
student achievements and signalling school quality, they have several
drawbacks.  Average test scores are an unreliable indicator of school
performance.  They fail to reflect variation at the classroom or form
level; they are often out of date; are affected by the mobility of students
and fail to distinguish the contribution of schools to student
achievement.
Rather than league tables, what is needed is a way of measuring the
additional impact of the educational services offered by the school.  The
concept of ‘value-added’ has therefore been applied to schooling.  It
attempts to separate the effects of the student and the school in the
attainment of educational outcomes.34  However, simple pre- and post-
testing may not accurately measure the effectiveness of the school since
it does not correct for the underlying ability of the student, the impact
of previous education that affects the rate of learning or the effects of
the family environment on learning.  Unlike the league tables, where
buyers buy information about the school, the costs of value-added43
testing are normally borne by the school because it is considered to
convey better information than a simple system of examinations and
league tables.
Rating Agencies
Similar to league tables for schools are organisations that offer
independent rating of service organisations.  The ratings typically
apply to hotels and restaurants which are consummate experience
goods.  Take, for example, a motel providing lodging services.   It is not
uncommon for a customer to book a motel prior to travel.  Because the
patron has not inspected the motel at the time of booking, information
asymmetry exists regarding the quality of the motel.  Some motels will
have an incentive to remove this information asymmetry, since they
perceive that their quality is high relative to their tariff.  These motels
are likely to band together to form an association or rating agency, even
though for credibility’s sake the rating agency is likely to ultimately be
a separate legal entity (see Box 13).  This rating agency will assign some
grade to motels, such as one star through to five stars.  Similar rating
organisations arise to evaluate hotels, cars, high fidelity stereo
components, airlines, and restaurants.
Box 13 - The Qualmark System
Qualmark is an independent rating system which is a joint
venture between the Automobile Association of New Zealand
and the New Zealand Tourism Board.  It operates a 1 to 5 star
rating system for hotels and motels.  Properties are visited
annually by assessors who check and evaluate in detail the
service quality and standards.  A property owner can obtain a
Qualmark quality rating for a fee of about $500 for 50 or more
rooms, and the right to display the rating.  Qualmark’s rating
system evaluates properties within three tiers;
backpackers/holiday parks, motels, and hotels.  Most Qualmark-
rated establishments have a three-star or higher rating as
establishments failing to obtain a three-star rating are unwilling
to pay money to be labelled as below average.  Properties display
the rating on their properties and in their advertising, and it is
also used in accommodation guides to help travellers choose
where they want to stay.
Yet, when it comes to schools, society currently does not provide
explicit ratings.35  The possible reasons for this are (1) that schools are
harder to rate than motels, (2) that all state funded schools are
presumed to be equal, and that explicitly different ratings would raise
issues of equity or (3) that features other than the quality of the school,
such as location, are a determinative factor for parents in deciding
where to enrol their children.
The efficacy of rating depends on the ease with which the quality and
performance can be measured.  It is difficult to separate the ability and
background of the student from the quality of the teaching.  Although44
value-added testing can go some way towards doing so, it is hard for
an independent agency to carry out tests of this kind.  For some
services, such as motels, there is a direct linkage between quantifiable
information and the quality of the service – for example the availability
of a TV in a room.
But because education is intangible, it is harder to measure the quality
of schooling along one dimension, even if that quality is quantifiable.  It
may simply not be appropriate to award schools or universities stars
like restaurants or hotels.  The Good Universities Guide provides
quantified information across a range of criteria allowing students to
select among universities according the measures that best suit their
needs (see Box 14).  The multi-dimensional nature of education is
explicitly recognised by awards by the publishers of the best university
each year, according to different criteria.  For example the University of
Queensland was selected as the 1998 winner for 'outstanding graduate
outcomes', with the best track record in delivering for graduates either
employment or access to further education.
The second possibility is that since state schools tend to dominate the
market for schooling, they act like a franchise in attempting to provide
a uniform service across all locations in order to fulfil their obligation of
providing equality of access to schooling.  Standardisation of the
curriculum and the regulation of the sector are means of achieving
uniformity, but are likely to be weaker than the mechanisms used to
ensure that franchisees offer a consistent service, as noted below.
The third possibility suggests that once parents have settled in a
particular area, the additional cost of moving or transporting their child
to another slightly better school further away may not be worth it.  In
other words, as long as the average quality of the local school is
acceptable, parents will not find it worthwhile to seek more
information about the quality of alternatives further away, although
they may want to compare the quality of all the local possibilities.  This
effect is likely to be lesser for parents who value education more highly
(and thus information about quality) or for older students who can
travel further to school.
The tertiary sector in contrast, is comprehensively rated in countries
such as the US and Australia by independent organisations.  Guides to
New Zealand universities, however are provided by universities
themselves, and do not provide rating comparisons.  One reason may
simply be that New Zealand has relatively few universities, and
potential students have other low cost ways of obtaining information
about them, such as asking friends and colleagues about their
experiences.45
Box 14 - Good Universities Guide
The Good Universities Guide to Australian Universities36 is an
independent and authoritative guide to universities, campuses
and undergraduate courses throughout Australia.  This
consumer guide to the quality of Australian higher education
serves prospective Australian and international students by
providing clear and accurate information about all Australian
higher education courses and institutions.
It features unique star ratings and rankings which compare
universities and undergraduate courses based on statistical data
provided by the universities.  The Guide's comprehensive
mapping of the undergraduate terrain also includes comparative
rankings and in-depth profiles of 39 universities and 21 other
institutions accredited to offer bachelor degrees.  Thirty fields of
study are surveyed, including comparisons of which universities
do best in which field.  Special overviews of TAFE and private
colleges which offer diploma courses are also reviewed.  The
ratings are based on statistics of the higher education sector in
Australia, together with surveys of graduates.
In addition to describing the institutions and the courses they
offer, it rates each institution and compares courses of study.
Ratings are based on:




• Graduate employment success
• Graduate starting salaries
• Flexibility of entry
4.5.6 Branding and Reputation
Where sellers have little to gain from producing goods of high quality,
they have little incentive to invest in their reputations.  When this
happens, low quality goods flood the market and drive out goods of
higher quality.  This is the ‘market for lemons’ problem.37  Yet if there is
a demand for high quality goods, both buyers and sellers have
incentives to devise arrangements to ensure that they are produced and
sold.
This can be achieved if the seller makes an investment that pays off
only if it produces the quality of goods it promises.  For this to work,
buyers must be aware of this investment, and the fact that it is at risk if
the sellers do not honour their commitments.38  Investment in
advertising or in a reputation for providing a certain quality are all
ways for the seller to provide information about the quality of the
goods on offer.  Schools are generally ‘repeat players’ in the market.
That is, they are long term providers of education and have incentives
to continue to attract students.46
Since the seller typically knows more about the quality of services it
offers than the buyer, it has an incentive to provide the buyer with
information.  In addition, because it is harder and more expensive for
the buyer to obtain the information, it is cheaper overall if the seller,
who can also control the quality, can convey the information.
But the information provided by the seller must be credible for it to be
effective in influencing the decision of the buyer.  One way to promote
credibility is for the seller to make an investment that is at risk if the
information turns out to be false.39  A trustworthy reputation for
providing high quality goods and services is a valuable asset for any
firm, as it reduces the transaction costs to the buyer of obtaining
additional information about the seller and ensuring that the terms of
the contract are fulfilled.
Schools, like other organisations, would have an incentive to develop
and then protect their reputations, since a reputation for poor quality
will affect the future demand for their services.  Schools would
therefore invest in activities which signal to both potential students and
their subsequent employers that a qualification from that school is
‘worth something’.  Investments in reputation, branding, goodwill or
specific or human capital are all means of providing information about
the quality of education to potential buyers and are common in other
areas of professional services (see Box 15).  These tangible activities are
proxies for the unobservable quality of the education on offer.
Box 15 - Law Firms
Legal services, like education are intangible experience goods.
The function of a lawyer is to keep a client out of trouble, or to
extricate the client who is in trouble.  Like education, it is hard to
separate the activities of the client from the efforts of the lawyer
in the legal outcome.  As a result, it is hard for the client to
discern the quality of the services provided.
Legal firms thus typically focus on the observable and tangible
aspects of their services as signals of quality.  High prices are
used as signals of high quality.  Branding establishes the
reputation of the firm through various channels.  Investment in
the recruitment of highly qualified, well presented and well-
spoken staff; the quality and presentation of the beautifully
decorated premises; glossy brochures and the high quality
documents provided to clients are all signals about the services
being provided.
Branding is often reinforced by seemingly minor aspects of a school’s
operation that seem to be at the margins of the main activity of teaching
and learning.  For example, some schools take care to maintain or
enhance investments in specific assets such as stone buildings covered
with ivy.  Many schools also rigorously enforce uniform dress codes.
These activities are intended to act as signals about the quality of the
educational services provided.47
An additional form of branding is provided by adherence to externally
monitored quality standards.  The ISO system for example, requires
that firms adhere to certain procedures (see Box 16).
Box 16 - University of Waikato Executive Education Programme
The University of Waikato Executive Education programme has
received ISO9001 accreditation.  Accreditation provides an
assurance that all appropriate procedures and processes are
followed properly.  The programme is audited annually to
ensure ongoing quality.  The Director, Ed Weymes, says that
while the system helps to ensure that the programme runs
smoothly, it does not ensure the quality of what is being taught.
It must therefore be supplemented by procedures that focus on
the academic programme, such as a rigorous hiring procedure
and on-going training of staff.
Although ISO accreditation of the programme is mentioned in
advertising, it is not a major feature.  Its value lies principally in
ensuring that proper procedures are followed, and so its impact
on the quality of the academic programme is indirect.
Other educational organisations have also been ISO accredited.
Waiariki Polytech, for example has had its entire programme ISO
accredited.
4.5.7 Warranties and Guarantees
Warranties and guarantees are another way for firms to signal the
quality of their goods and services.  They represent a commitment to
ensuring quality and involve a loss to the firm if the quality is not met.
They are often used where goods are complex, where the quality is not
easily discernible by the buyer beforehand, where defects only become
apparent after some time, but are evident once they appear and where
replacement, repair or a refund is adequate recompense (see Box 17).
But guarantees of goods such as cars and appliances have limited
application to schooling, since it is rare that education failure becomes
evident in a manner similar to the failure of a reconditioned engine.
Also, getting a refund of school fees does not recompense the damage.48
Box 17 - Engine Reconditioning
Reconditioned automotive engines vary in quality.  A purchaser
of an engine cannot tell the quality of the engine until they have
bought it and installed it in their car.  The reconditioner also has
difficulty identifying which engines are good and which are not.
The problem in this case is not so much that an information
asymmetry exists, but that information regarding quality is
difficult to obtain.
Let us assume that two out of every 100 reconditioned engines
fail within 1,000km of reconditioning.  If a customer purchases an
engine, the possible outcomes they face include complete loss of
their money.  However, the engine reconditioner can diversify
this risk across a large number of transactions.  Thus, the
observed solution in such businesses is that the reconditioner
provides a guarantee for the first 1,000kms or so, long enough to
identify whether the engine works or not.  The price charged for
each engine implicitly includes an insurance premium that
covers the cost of the cases where the price of the engine must be
refunded under the guarantee.
Diversification of risk by a supplier is a common means of
dealing with variation that is unobservable at the time of a
transaction, but is observable later.
Recall the laser eye procedure example (Box 7) above.  That procedure
has a two percent chance of resulting in a worse visual outcome than
the ‘corrected’ vision prior to the procedure.  This failure is reasonably
easily measurable by simple eye charts.  Yet, the eye clinic does not
provide a guarantee in a similar way to the engine reconditioner.  The
reason for this is likely to be that if the procedure has worsened the
customer’s eyesight, refunding the money is not going to fix the
problem, and in fact is likely to lead to litigation.
Similar difficulties would arise in schooling with money-back
guarantees, even if it were possible to measure educational failure.  Yet
it is possible for provide guarantees of teaching quality where pre- and
post-testing is used to measure the effectiveness of teaching and to
separate it from the effect of the natural ability of the student.  For
example, Sylvan Learning centres provide a learning guarantee (see
Box 20), as do some driving schools.49
Box 18 - Sylvan Learning Centres
Sylvan Learning Centres provide personalised instructional
services to students of any age and skill level.  They provide
tuition for children wanting to catch up, advance or prepare for
university, tailoring each student’s programme to their needs.
Learning begins with assessing and evaluating each student
using multiple indicators to identify academic strengths and
weaknesses.  These include several standardised tests using
national norms and Sylvan customised tests, vision and hearing
screenings, interviews and recent performance in school.
The Sylvan Skills Assessment facilitates an appropriate match
from hundreds of available lesson plans.  Sylvan measures
progress by re-testing each student at appropriate levels.
With Sylvan’s Personal Learning programme, students are
guaranteed to improve at least one full grade level equivalent in
reading skills or basic math skills after 36 hours of instruction, or
12 additional hours are provided at no extra cost.  Measurement
is based on a nationally recognised achievement test for
improvement in academic reading of basic mathematics.
4.5.8 Associations
The costs to a single seller of establishing a good reputation can be
high, particularly when purchases are intermittent.  Co-operation with
other sellers can reduce these costs and build up buyer loyalty to the
whole group, thus increasing repeat business.
Associations of firms in the same sector can reduce the transaction costs
to the buyer of using another firm.  For example, a hotel that is a
member of a marketing association can help the traveller to make a
hotel booking in the next town with another member of the association.
There are also economies of scale in marketing, and the reputation
established for the group as a whole benefits each of the members.
The Independent Schools Association in New Zealand is an example of
this type of organisation in the education sector.  Although each
member school is privately owned and operated, the association
provides marketing and lobbying services to the industry.  At the
tertiary level, certain university groupings emerge which can be
construed as mechanisms for signalling, and potentially encouraging,
superior quality.  Examples are the Group of Seven universities in
Australia, and the Universitas 21 international grouping of universities.
These associations may also involve the use of a common curriculum
and examinations or a common teaching approach.  They can thus
facilitate the involvement of students between schools.  An association
may represent one end a continuum of co-operation among schools
with vertical integration.50
4.5.9 Chains
The horizontal integration of firms into chains provides economies of
scale in the purchase of inputs and in marketing expenditures.  At the
same time, the investment in the reputation provides information to
potential buyers, particularly where the chain offers uniform services.
A chain of motels, travel lodges or hotels tells a potential patron
something of its quality, thus reducing information asymmetry.  An
organisation can develop or purchase a number of establishments, and
manage them in a way that ensures homogeneous quality in line with
patrons’ expectations.
A chain has advantages over a mere membership of a rating
organisation which focuses on observable and measurable inputs as
proxies for information about quality.  The chain’s investment in
branding establishes a reputation for quality of service which it can
capture in repeat business (see Box 19).  The chain involves some
standardisation of services that acts as a signalling or branding device
to potential clients.
The formation of chains of schools would be likely in an environment
where the state sector did not dominate.  A chain would offer
significant advantages to schools in economies of scale in
administration and marketing, as well as in the development of a
curriculum and common approach to pedagogy.  Similar chains
already exist within school sectors elsewhere.  For example, schools
sponsored and owned by a single religious organisation could be
viewed as a chain or network.  The Edison Project in the USA runs a
chain of schools (see Box 20).51
Box 19 – Silver Oaks Group
Greg Wilson is Managing Director of Silver Oaks Group, owners
and operators of motor inns.  It is natural that he would know
more about the quality of his properties than his potential
patrons do.  In fact, he makes it his business to know the quality
of his properties.  Approximately every three months, Greg
personally visits each property and checks 100 quality aspects of
10 rooms chosen at random, and also reviews all systems.  While
it is desirable that a manager be informed about the quality of
each property, it is also in Greg’s interest to make sure that
potential patrons of his properties can ascertain the quality of his
properties prior to placing a booking.
While Qualmark rating appears to be an obvious solution for
Greg, he does not perceive it as such.  In fact, he is quite
animated in his explanation of why Qualmark’s testing and
certification system is flawed.  For a start, Greg’s motor inns
don’t fit in any category.  What is a 55-room property with its
own restaurant and 24-hour room service?  Are they five-star
motels or two and a half-star hotels?  The background colour of
the rating sign indicates on what tier of establishments the rating
is based.  But a potential patron is unlikely to comprehend the
importance of the background colour.  On top of this, he is
frustrated with the algorithmic testing procedure.  ‘They walk
round with a clipboard counting coat-hangers and checking
ironing boards, but they never check my systems.  They don’t
check complaint procedures, for example.  They don’t ask
patrons what they think of their stay.  They don’t have a meal in
the restaurant, don’t order pizza at 1:00am, don’t ride in the
shuttle bus …’  Greg is wound up.  What he sees as Qualmark’s
checking of inputs rather than outputs clearly frustrates him.
So how does the Silver Oaks Group provide a quality signal to
potential patrons? Greg has found from experience that the vast
majority of their bookings are based on relationships.  For
example, travel agents will recommend their properties.
Companies such as airlines will contract for accommodation of
flight crews on an ongoing basis.  The group participates in a
number of reward systems, which encourage loyalty to a subset
of properties.  For example, they participate in AMEX rewards,
Fly Buys, Smart Buy and a corporate Travel Card.  For him,
reputation, repeat business from loyal customers, and
relationships with travel agents and travel companies are far
more effective solutions to signalling quality to potential
customers than a rating agency.52
Box 20 - The Edison Project
The Edison Project, founded in 1991, is the leading private
manager of public schools in the United States.  After engaging
in three years of intensive research and development to design
innovative schools that could operate at public school spending
levels, Edison opened its first four schools in August 1995.
Edison has now implemented its school design in 51 public
schools, including many charter schools, which it operates under
management contracts with local school districts and charter
school boards.  Approximately 24,000 students currently attend
Edison partnership schools.
The Edison Project establishes partnership schools in contract
with public school districts or charter school authorities within
the local community.  In either case, The Edison Project takes
responsibility for implementing the educational program,
technology plans, and management systems, and is accountable
to a local authority for the performance of the school.  Edison
schools remain public schools, open to all students and funded
with tax dollars.
Generally, students in Edison schools are representative of the
communities in which the schools reside.  Edison offers a
comprehensive education programme designed to work for
students of all types, from those who find school difficult to
those for whom success comes easily.
In surveys of parent and student satisfaction conducted for The
Edison Project by the Gordon S.  Black Corporation, 90 percent of
parents gave their schools A or B ratings, very high grades by
national standards.  Among students, who are tougher critics of
their schools, between two-thirds and three-fourths gave their
schools an A or B, with an A clearly the most popular grade.
Edison schools have strong parent involvement, as evidenced by
a 94 percent attendance rate among parents at quarterly
conferences to discuss their children's academic progress; a 94
percent student attendance rate; and a student mobility rate
below 10 percent annually, a figure that is superior to rates in
comparable schools.
Edison schools have long waiting lists.  In Boston, Massachusetts,
for example, more than 1,600 students are waiting to enroll in the
Boston Renaissance Charter School; and in Wichita, Kansas, the




An alternative to a chain of firms under single ownership is
franchising.  Franchising is different from a chain because it involves
the individual ownership of a firm that buys a right to provide goods
and services in a particular way from another firm.  The franchisee is
the owner of the firm and bears both the costs and the benefits of the
operation.  In a chain, on the other hand, the local manager is an
employee who does not bear the costs or enjoy the benefits of the
operation.
A particular characteristic of franchises is their uniformity.  The
processes and procedures are developed by the franchisor and the
franchisee pays for the right to use them.  Uniformity is ensured by the
investment that the franchisee must make in specific assets (such as the
design of the premises) or the penalty that must be paid if the
standards of the franchisor are not met.  Ensuring that service
organisations provide similar quality therefore does not require that
those organisations be owned in common.
Franchises are common in some service industries, such as hotels and
accounting.  They are less common in other industries such as law and
medicine.  The choice of organisational form, whether chain or
franchise depends on their relative operational efficiency.40  Franchising
is often preferred to horizontal integration where firms are
geographically dispersed and costly to monitor.41  They allow the
franchisor to draw on local knowledge and taste and market conditions
in determining the goods and services to offer.  The potential for
franchising in the education sector is illustrated by remedial services
(see Box 21).42
Franchising is a potential way for schools to co-operate with one
another to provide a market signal of quality.  As in the case of school
rating agencies, the major impediment is likely to be societal
expectations that state schools are of homogenous quality.  We consider
this a significant but not inherent impediment to schools developing
economically rational responses to heterogeneity in school quality.54
Box 21 - Kip McGrath Education Centres
Kip McGrath Education Centres involve franchised after-school
tutoring of students from Std 1 to Form 4.  They also provide
school-based tutoring for schools which are bulk-funded and
have the flexibility to contract these services.
The franchise has been operating in Australia for 20 years and
expanded to New Zealand in 1990.  David Wardell is the Master
Franchisee and sells franchises throughout the country.
Franchises are sold only to qualified teachers.  The purchase
provides an exclusive geographic zone, tutoring materials, an
initial training course and ongoing conferences.  The training
course covers both business and education elements as it
involves marketing, the overall culture of the organisation and
educational approach to tutoring.
Quality assurance involves an exhaustive selection process and
an extensive initial training course and on-going training,
together with on-going monitoring and auditing of the
franchisees.  The franchise also relies on the market to ensure
quality, since students only pay on a week by week basis.
However, after a few weeks when they have built up some trust
in the organisation, parents typically pre-pay for the tutoring.
Students are initially assessed to identify their strengths and
weaknesses if they require tutoring with the core material
between Std 1 and Form 4, but older students in particular
already know the areas in which they need help.  The centres do
not provide explicit guarantees.
The franchisee has some flexibility in providing tutoring services
within the overall approach and materials, reflecting the
complexity of teaching and the diverse needs of students.  The
structure of the franchise is intended to allow centres to meet the
diverse needs of students within a franchising framework.
Relationship Management
Yet another way that information asymmetries between a service
purchaser and supplier are dealt with is demonstrated by the
relationship developed between Japanese car manufacturers and their
suppliers.  Japanese component parts manufacturers encourage car
manufacturers to place technical support engineers within the
supplier’s factory.43
An example that is more readily applicable to New Zealand is that of
factory visits.  For example, a vintner will generally pay much time and
attention to showing a potential customer the care with which his or
her wine is produced.  Food processing factories typically have guided
tours.  A potential reason for such tours is to provide information to
customers as to the cleanliness and care which is part of the production
process.  Organisations which pay very little care and attention to55
cleanliness are unlikely to choose to conduct factory tours.  Thus, the
availability of a factory tour is a signal of quality in and of itself.
The parallel for schools is the active participation of parents in school
activities.  For example, parent-teacher associations (PTAs) can act to
reduce asymmetries, as can open days, sports days, school concerts,
and parent volunteer programmes.  If parents can observe the
educational process first-hand, information asymmetries regarding the
quality of that process will be diminished.  In fact, simply enabling
parents to enter the classroom at any time would be a significant signal
of quality.
4.6 Not for Profit?
While schools vary considerably in their ownership and control
structures, one common characteristic is the absence of an explicit
residual claimant.  Unlike for-profit organisations, private schools as
they are currently structured seldom have shares or other ownership
rights giving owners a simultaneous share of both profits and control.
Thus, the individuals running a school are typically not incentivised by
a claim over any operating surplus.  However, there is nothing inherent
about primary and secondary education that precludes such an
arrangement, as the Edison Project and examples from related sectors
(such as post-school learning centres) would appear to indicate.44
The Edison Project illustrated in Box 20, is a private American manager
of public schools.  Edison operates 51 public schools serving more than
24,000 students in 26 communities across the United States of America.
Edison is a for-profit company which plans to list its shares on a stock
exchange in the near future.  It is currently incentivising teachers by
issuing them with options ahead of the public float.  Thus, both a
school’s managers and teachers will have the common goal of
maximising the market value of Edison’s equity (see Box 22).56
Box 22  - Employee Options: The Edison Project
Edison, Teachers Union, and School District Announce
Innovative Stock Option Plan for Teachers
Officials from the Edison Project, Miami Dade County Public
Schools (MDCPS), and the United Teachers of Dade (UTD)
jointly announced today that the 90 teachers and staff members
of Henry S.  Reeves Elementary School will receive stock options
in Edison, America's largest private manager of public schools.
Edison officials noted that the company will make options
available to any Edison school that requests them.
...
‘This is the first time in the history of American education that
teachers have become direct economic stake holders in the public
schools where they work.  Its about time,’ said Pat Tornillo,
Executive Vice President of the UTD.
‘This is an innovative approach to teacher compensation that did
not come in exchange for scaling back teachers' salary and
benefits,’ said Sandra Feldman, President of the American
Federation of Teachers.  ‘It was done in partnership with the
union.  It should be interesting to see how it turns out.’
Tornillo and Chris Whittle, Edison's founder and CEO, both
noted that the options plan will help reinforce the school's top
priority-improved student achievement.  Added Whittle, ‘Until
now, education has been one of the few sectors in the U.S.
economy where the people doing the front-line work were not in
a position to reap rewards from the enterprise's success, which in
the case of schools is improved student performance.  We want
to help change that.  Our curriculum and professional
development are helping teachers succeed professionally.  We
hope our option plan will help them succeed financially.’
…
‘Teachers and staff will continue doing exactly what they have
been doing - helping children get a great education,’ said
Tornillo.  ‘The difference is they now have an ownership interest
in success in the same way that millions of employees in the
private sector do.’
Source: http://www.edisonproject.com/ October 22, 1998
For profit firms are common in other professional services, such as
medical care.  It is notable that the inherent characteristics of these
health services resemble education in many respects.  For-profit firms
in health care take a number of forms, from individual medical
practitioners acting alone, to partnerships and private companies (see
Box 23).57
Box 23 – Private Hospitals
Southern Cross Healthcare is a Friendly Society (governed by the
Friendly Societies and Credit Unions Act 1982).  In essence this
means that they are a non-profit organisation, owned by its
members.  Started in 1961 by a group of community-minded
individuals, its members numbered 900.  Membership now
stands at just over one million.
Southern Cross Healthcare is divided into (1) The Southern Cross
Medical Care Society which is responsible for provision of
insurance (2) The Southern Cross Hospital Trust which is
responsible for the hospital network (13 in all, made up of 551
beds) and owned by the Medical Care Society and (3) Southern
Cross Benefits - the profit-making arm that provides travel
Insurance.  Recently it merged with Royal Sun Alliance to create
"Fusion" to look after the new @WORK workers' compensation.
Ascot Integrated Hospital is a profit-seeking company.  It is
organised along the same lines as the Southern Cross hospitals in
that surgeons and consultants are clients that pay to use hospital
facilities.  The $47 million investment for land and buildings was
put up by Calan Healthcare Properties Trust.  Other capital was
raised from investors some of whom are doctors and may or may
not also be clients.  The Hospital holds around 62 percent of the
lease on the property.  Other tenants spent a further $14 million
on plant and equipment.
For-profit arrangements such as The Edison Project are not currently
common in education.  A fundamental question is whether this lack of
a residual claimant is an inherent feature of schooling that would occur
absent any government involvement in education.  Regardless of
whether this is an inherent attribute or a response to government
intervention, it is clear that most schools are not run with the express
incentive of generating an operating surplus.  Instead, they dissipate
any surplus that may arise through:
• expenditure to increase the quality of education provided;
• higher payments to suppliers of educational inputs;
• lower fees;
• activities associated with non-educational objectives, such as
religious activities;
• benefits consumed by a school’s management or trustees; and
• investments to cover potential future operating deficits.
Schools may select either for-profit or non-profit status.  An
examination of the tertiary education sector suggests that for-profit
institutions may be efficient where the content of instruction is well-
defined, high quality research is of little complementary value to
teaching, students use education for learning rather than certification
and there are independent means of certifying student quality.  In58
contrast, non-profit institutions are efficient at producing high quality
research and academic status for both staff and students.45  Schools
typically do not involve research as a complement to teaching,
curricula are often well specified, and despite the difficulties mentioned
above of measuring the quality of educational outcomes, they are
routinely assessed through mechanisms such as examinations.
In circumstances conducive to a for-profit form of organisation, such a
business structure has a number of advantages for owners.  A single
objective of profit-maximisation creates clear incentives for owners and
managers, and allows the performance of the school to be monitored by
owners, creditors (such as banks) and suppliers.  Consumers (current
and potential students and their parents, as well as employers) are
likely to monitor the performance of the school against other criteria
such as examination results.  These measures are also likely to be
important for shareholders because of their potential impact on
profitability.  The for-profit form permits the school to raise equity
capital in the market.  It also creates strong incentives for performance
to maximise profits and minimise costs, with threats of bankruptcy or
takeover.
However, in practice, there would be significant risks to any operator
of a for-profit school if the school relied on government subsidies for
the bulk (or all) of its revenues.  In particular, the funding source may
be at risk of variable and unpredicted change.  This may make the task
of credible contracting between a for-profit school and the government
quite difficult, although the scope of such difficulties is likely to be
small if government ownership of schools continues to dominate the
sector.
Quite apart from these considerations, there are a number of potential
reasons whey running a school as a non-profit organisation might be
preferred:
• people are likely to be more willing to donate money to a school
if they are certain that their money is not going directly to the
residual claimants.  Similarly, they are more willing to donate
time as volunteer assistants (eg, drivers, food
preparers/providers, coaches);
• it is easier to make a case for government funding;
• tax benefits often exist for the organisation and its donors;
• other objectives can be made explicit and be consistently
pursued.  (eg, religious objectives); and
• parents may be more willing to trust the school’s statements,
believing that the school’s managers are acting in their interest
rather than in the interests of owners.
There are certain disadvantages in the non-profit form.  The most
significant is that the organisation often has mixed objectives, making it
difficult to measure its performance and creating mixed signals for all
its stakeholders.  In addition, it is often not clear who the residual
claimants are, and the staff become the de facto principal stakeholders in
the school.  Governance arrangements are often weak, and as described59
above, there may not be strong disciplines on costs.  It can be difficult
for non-profits to raise equity capital, and shortfalls in revenues are
often addressed through appeals for donations.
Non-profit organisations tend to have multiple objectives in the
absence of an over-arching goal of maximising shareholders’ wealth.
We have discussed the problems inherent in simultaneously seeking
multiple objectives.  How do not-for-profit organisations deal with this
problem?  One solution is for the not-for-profit organisation to separate
its trading activities from its philanthropic objectives.
For example, the founders of Kelloggs, the breakfast food company had
objectives other than maximising shareholder wealth.  The solution
chosen by Kelloggs to deal with the debilitating effects of multiple
objectives was to set up Kelloggs as a profit-seeking corporation and
ascribe a large portion of its ownership interest to a philanthropic trust.
Thus, Kelloggs has the sole objective of maximising shareholders’
wealth, and the trust has the sole objective of distributing this wealth in
accordance with the wishes of the trust’s settlors.  The Sanatarium
Health food Company which also manufactures breakfast cereal, deals
with the problem of multiple objectives by maximising profits which it
uses for charitable purposes (see Box 27).
The application of the Kelloggs and Sanitarium business analogies to
schools indicates that schools could have non-commercial objectives
and be operated as businesses with clear goals to maximise the value of
the school for residual claimants.  In addition, a charitable trust could
be allocated all or part of the residual claim, and provided with explicit
directions as to how such wealth is to be spent.  For example, the trust
deed could specify that the proceeds were to be used to provide
educational scholarships, support extra-curricular activities, facilitate
social occasions, invite distinguished guests and so on.  Of course, such
a solution creates another problem; how to incentivise the trustees to
act as committed owners of the school when their own wealth is not at
stake.  The Kelloggs example would indicate that this problem is not
insurmountable.
Note that for-profit organisations are in some cases able to obtain some
of the benefits of non-profit organisations, such as motivating
donations and volunteer assistance.  For instance, Auckland
International Airport (AIA), a publicly-listed profit-seeking company,
has a small army of dedicated volunteers who work at the International
Terminal.  These volunteers provide assistance to passengers; meeting
disabled passengers at the gate, wheeling those in wheelchairs, and
providing assistance to unaccompanied children, or a parent travelling
with babies and young children.  Presumably these volunteers are
willing to provide such services free of charge because they consider
they are providing an ‘extra’ service, rather than simply providing
labour free of charge that AIA would otherwise have to pay someone
for.  AIA consider that their volunteers are motivated by a desire to
project Aucklanders as caring people, and New Zealanders as friendly
people.  In essence, AIA has been able to ring-fence a part of its
operations that (1) is seen as providing benefits for Auckland or New60
Zealand primarily, and to AIA secondarily, and (2) would not occur in
the absence of volunteered labour.
Box 24 - Sanitarium Health Food Company
Sanitarium Health Food Company manufactures and sells
breakfast foods and a range of vegetarian health foods.  It is
owned by the Australasian Conference Association, which is
wholly owned by the Seventh-day Adventist Church.
Sanitarium has had a number of objectives, including:
• providing funds to support the charitable activities of the
Seventh-day Adventist Church;
• providing a healthy range of foods for vegetarians, since a
large proportion of the firm’s constituency are vegetarian;
• providing employment opportunities in an organisation that
is sensitive to the religious  convictions of church members.
eg., morning worship, early close on Friday afternoon,  no
Sabbath work, drug-free work environment, providing
flexible work hours for theology and education students at
church colleges; and
• increasing the general health of society, a goal of the
Seventh-day Adventist Church.
Each of these objectives has changed in importance over the
years.  For instance, providing vegetarian food is less significant
today than it was years ago when vegetarian alternatives were
quite limited.  Also, providing flexible work opportunities for
trainee teachers and ministers is less important now that such
studies are typically full-time and at least partially state-funded.
For this reason, small Sanitarium factories situated near church
colleges have closed and production moved to large, efficient
factories.
These multiple goals naturally conflict, and it is not surprising
that in the early 1990’s Sanitarium provided minimal funds to its
owners.  Failure to provide surpluses for charitable activities was
excused by the need to achieve other objectives.  For example,
‘desirable’ product ranges were expanded with little concern
with product profitability.  Sanitarium has recently been
reorganised along the lines of a modern, profit-seeking company,
and, as a consequence, it again provides funds to its owner to
support charitable activities.
In the same way, a hypothetical for-profit school, could presumably
still motivate volunteer support for activities where (1) the students
were seen as the beneficiaries rather than the school’s shareholders, and
(2) the activity is seen as ‘something extra’, beyond the core activity of
the school.  For example, students’ parents might still be willing to
operate a volunteer ‘tuck shop’, providing wholesome, low-cost food to
students.  They might be willing to provide after-school coaching for
extra-curricular sporting activities.  For profit schools are thus not
inherently incompatible with donated input.61
It is unclear whether the existing domination of non-profit schools is an
indication that the benefits of such an organisational form outweigh the
disadvantages, or that for-profit schools are currently precluded
because of current state funding and regulation.  We do note, however,
that two observations indicate that schools are not inherently non-
profit.  First, schools have not always been run as non-profit
organisations.46  History indicates that the demise of for-profit schools
is roughly co-incident with state adoption of educational responsibility.
Also, we observe a large number of specialist schools that are run as
for-profit organisations.  Music schools, driving schools, dance schools,
defence schools, and language schools are just a few educational
establishments run with the intention of maximising shareholders’
wealth.  Of course, the skills these ‘schools’ engender are not part of the
‘core’ curriculum offered by primary and secondary schools which
provide a universal service, under current legislation.
4.7 Conclusion
The structure of schools can be viewed as a response to the nature of
the educational services they provide.  The provision of education
involves transaction costs for both buyers and sellers that arise from the
inherent variation in educational outcomes.  The variation arises
because of the variability in the inputs into education (such as the
natural ability of the student and his or her prior level of educational
attainment) and the process of education (such as the quality of
educational services).
The existence and structure of schools can be explained by the existence
of transaction and nature costs, in the same way that transaction costs
explain the existence of firms.  Transaction costs are all those costs that
surround economic activity and exchange.  They encompass a
spectrum including the costs of information, of negotiation, of drawing
up and enforcing contracts, of defining and enforcing property rights,
of monitoring performance, and of changing institutional
arrangements.  In short, they comprise all the costs that are not simply
the costs of physical production.  The very existence of organisations is
a response to transaction costs.  The objective is to minimise their total
costs (transaction costs plus production costs) for a given level of
output.  The structure of schools can also be examined as a response to
the nature of transaction costs.  There are a number of existing features
of schools that appear to be inherent, rather than reflections of
government intervention.  In addition, other aspects of schools (such as
vertical integration or franchising) which are not currently observed,
might arise as a consequence of these inherent features.
Schools are a form of organisation that economises on the costs of co-
ordination and takes advantage of specialisation.  If there were no
schools, parents could contract with a number of individual teachers to
provide instruction to their children.  However, searching for
appropriate teachers and monitoring their quality could be costly.  The
costs co-ordinating specialist teaching could be high, and a generalist
teacher might not have the range of necessary skills.  A school can be a
less costly alternative as it assembles and co-ordinates the necessary62
educational and administrative skills to provide educational services.
A school can take advantage of economies of scale (teaching many
students at once) or economics of scope (teaching a range of subjects).
A school can also obtain information about the teachers it employs and
assess their performance.
The structure of schools is likely to be diverse.  Schools could take a
number of organisational forms, from schools as corporate entities that
employ a number of teachers, to schools that provide premises but
lease them to individual teachers under contract.  There is also likely to
be scope for individual teachers to offer instruction to students as
specialist music teachers do now.
A significant characteristic of schools is that they involve long term
relationships between students and the school on the one hand, and
between teachers and the school on the other.  Schools do not operate
on a ‘spot’ market.  There is a durability or persistence in the decision
to attend a school that does not involve very frequent changes between
schools.  The long term nature of these relationships arises because
transaction costs make very frequent moves costly.  There can be
significant transaction costs for both teachers and students in moving
between schools.  They are likely to arise from the costs of the
disruption of personal relationships between students and their
teachers; the disruption of learning when it is hard to find out what a
student has already learned and the costs of obtaining information
about the quality of education provided at the new school.  Students
and teachers also acquire skills and knowledge that may be quite
specific to the school and the course of study and which may make it
difficult to transfer to another school.
Education is a complex product, making the assessment of teaching
and school quality costly and difficult.  Education, like many other
services is an ‘experience good’ whose quality is not easily discerned
before it is used.  Measuring the quality of schooling is difficult because
it is hard to observe the ability of students and the quality of their effort
and to separate these effects from the value added by the school.  The
value added by the school in one year also depends on what the
student has learned in previous years, and thus may be affected by
prior poor teaching.
Schools use a range of mechanisms to assure potential students and
employers of past students about the quality of the education they
provide.  The difficulties of measuring the quality of education
provided by a school underlies the use of a range of mechanisms to
signal the quality of the school.  The parents of potential students have
an incentive to obtain information about the quality of the school, and
potential employers have an incentive to find out the level of education
of potential employees.  The school also has an incentive to provide
information about the quality of the services it provides in order to
attract and retain students.  It is more cost-effective for the school to
provide this information because it has better information than parents
or employers about the quality of the services they provide and also
controls the quality.63
Examinations and other systems of measuring educational attainment
are commonly used by schools to measure the achievements of
students.  Qualifications are granted to students on the basis of their
educational performance, and are used by them to signal their value to
potential employers.  Employers use qualifications as a cost-effective
way of finding, screening potential employees and out what they
know.  Examination systems are also used as measures of what
students who are still at school have already learned, and so common
curricula and performance measures (such as examinations) facilitate
the movement of students between schools.
A number of forms of measuring performance are likely to arise.  The
information provided by measures of educational attainment is
enhanced if the measures are comparable across a range of schools and
if measurement is independent.  Schools may develop a common
system of examinations that they all use, or independent providers
could develop and administer examinations for schools.
Vertical integration is a response to the existence of the costs of
frequent transactions.  When students move between schools (for
example between primary and secondary school) there is likely to be
some disruption to their education and the relationships they have
formed with other students and teachers.  Co-operation and the co-
ordination of examinations, curricula, school culture and teaching
approach between schools where most students move from one to
another could reduce these costs.  The relationship could involve
informal arrangements at one end and full vertical integration under a
single owner at another.  Savings of other costs such as administration
and marketing may also foster greater integration.
Teachers have an incentive to signal their quality to schools as potential
employers.  Teachers know more about their ability than do schools
who are their potential employers.  This informational difficulty arises
in other employment situations, but is exacerbated in teaching because
it is hard to observe the quality of the educational outputs.
Certification is a way of reducing the transaction costs for schools
employing prospective teachers, since it reduces the need for each to
ascertain the quality of the teacher independently.  Voluntary
professional associations are likely to emerge in order to provide
quality assurance to schools through teacher certification, as they do in
other occupations.
Independent organisations are likely to rate school quality.  Customers
rarely know more about a service’s quality than the provider does, yet
have a strong incentive to obtain sufficient information about the
service they intend to buy in order to make a decision.  Independent
organisations can provide information about service quality as they do
for other services such as hotels and restaurants.  However,  the
multidimensional nature of education and the diverse needs of
students may make it difficult to provide a single measure of quality,
such as a ‘star’ system.
Schools are likely to invest in branding by developing a reputation for
providing educational services of a certain type and quality.  Since a64
school knows more about the quality of services it offers than students
or their parents, and it is harder and more expensive for the buyer to
obtain the information, it is cheaper overall if the schools provide
information.  But the information must be credible for it to be effective
in influencing the decision of the buyer.  One way to promote
credibility is for the seller to develop a trustworthy reputation that is
compromised if the quality is not met.  Investments in reputation,
branding and goodwill are all means of providing information about
the quality of education to potential buyers, and are common in other
areas of professional services.  These tangible activities are proxies for
the unobservable quality of the education on offer.
Chains of schools can economise on the costs of branding.  A chain
could be developed with a number of schools offering standard
teaching approaches or curricula as a signalling or branding device that
differentiate it from other schools.  The chain’s investment in branding
would establish a reputation for a certain quality or type of service
which it could capture in repeat business across the whole chain.
Students shifting between schools would be likely to move to another
school in the same chain, thus displaying some ‘brand loyalty.’ The
branding would reinforce the ‘lock in’ of a long term relationship to the
chain, but would facilitate movement between schools through
common courses and performance measures.  A chain would offer
schools significant advantages such as economies of scale in
administration and marketing, as well as in the development of a
curriculum and common approach to pedagogy.  Chains of businesses
are common in other sectors.
Schools could operate as franchises.  An alternative to a chain of
schools under single ownership is franchising.  Franchising would
involve an individual school buying the right to provide a particular
type of education from the franchisor which develops the curriculum
and teaching approach to be used.  A particular characteristic of
franchises is their uniformity.  Franchising is often preferred where
firms are geographically dispersed and costly to monitor.  Franchises
are common in some service industries, such as hotels and accounting
and already exist in some sectors of education.65
5 The Market Practices of the School
5.1 Introduction
Just as transaction costs lie at the heart of the ways that schools are
structured, they also help to explain the ways that schools may behave
in the market.  In Section 4 we described schools as a nexus of contracts
between students, parents and teachers.  In this section we focus on
how transaction costs influence what schools do.  Schools typically:
• offer compatible qualifications, courses and programmes of
instruction;
• group students together;
• facilitate students learning from each other;
• cater for a diversity of student needs by specialising in niche
markets;
• provide a range of services to students in addition to teaching;
• provide custodial services for children;
• use facilities cost-effectively; and
• take advantage of technology in providing education.
The focus of this section is on how schools might interact with one
another and with their clients to provide educational services.  Just as
in the previous section (related to the structure of schools), this section
emphasises the inherent features of education that affect the ways
schools are likely to function. It draws on analogies from the business
world in drawing inferences about the likely behaviour of schools.
There are two particular points of difference between schools and other
business that give rise to unique functions that do not have precise
parallels in other sectors.
The first is related to complex nature of education and the difficulties of
finding out what students know.  This is a problem not only for
employers of graduates, but also arises when students move between
schools.  This problem is not evident in the current regulatory
environment in New Zealand, largely because all schools share a
common system of examinations and thus a compatible curriculum, but
its seriousness becomes apparent when students move to other
countries or even move between different states with different schools
systems in countries such as Australia.  Schools are likely to develop
mechanisms to facilitate the movement of students and to provide
credible signals to employers about the quality of the education they
provide.
The second issue is the custodial nature of schools.  Although it is not
necessary for students to leave the homes to obtain an education (for
example if they use distance learning), schooling that is not undertaken
in the student’s own home involves the custody of children.  Again, it is66
helpful to envisage a world in which the education of children was not
compulsory.  In this case, parents would contract with schools to
educate their children, to provide a safe environment and to ensure
that the children stayed at the school for instruction.  Such a contract
would be necessary simply because (as is commonly recognised in law)
children are not necessarily the best judges of their own long term
welfare, and might not wish to attend school.  There are few parallels to
this situation in business.
This section examines these features of education that give rise to
unique functions among schools and also examines other functions of
schools that have parallels in business.
5.2 Compatible Qualifications
A notable feature of schools is the fact that they offer broadly similar
courses of instruction.  While this phenomenon is largely the result of
government regulation, the crucial issue is whether schools would offer
comparable qualifications in the absence of such regulations.
There are important network effects in the operation of schools that
underlie their tendency to become standardised.  Network effects occur
when the more consumers or producers there are of a product or
service, the greater the overall benefits.47  A familiar example is the
internet.  If only one person connects to the internet, it is not worth
much, but if many people connect, then there are more opportunities to
communicate with other people who have connections.  Network
effects result in the adoption of compatible or standardised systems to
increase the number of participants and the overall value of the
activity.  Telephones and railways are other examples of
standardisation to promote interaction.
Network effects also occur in the school sector.  If a single school has a
unique system of qualifications, it is hard for students to move to
another school, which must assess the student’s knowledge afresh
upon enrolment.  But if more than one school uses the same system of
examinations, the easier it is for students to move among them.  The
greater the number of schools using a single system the greater the ease
with which students can transfer between schools.  The use of
standardised examinations and accreditation are thus two possible
responses to the existence of network effects to maximise the value of
interaction and ensure compatibility.  They also act as signals of quality
as discussed in Section 4.5.2.
5.2.1 Examinations
Moving between schools can be made easier if schools negotiate with
one another to adopt compatible qualifications that reflect an agreed
standard of achievement.  A common system of examinations can
promote interaction between schools.  This use of examinations
complements its use as a device for signalling school quality discussed
in Section 4.5.  Schools could differentiate themselves according to the
examinations they offered, so that a grouping of schools would develop67
offering a particular examination.  A competing grouping of schools
would offer an alternative sort of examination.  Some schools might
offer highly academic examinations, while another set of schools could
be more vocational.  The adoption of common examination systems
among competing groups of schools would simultaneously promote
co-operation between the network of schools and facilitate competition
among them.
The incentives to adopt common examinations to facilitate interaction
between schools is strengthened by the need of schools to signal their
quality, as previously discussed.  While a single school can invest
considerable resources in establishing a reputation for high quality, it is
still difficult for potential employers, for example, to measure the
differences between students.  In other words, just having attended a
school provides some information about the general level of education
provided by the school, but not much about the actual educational
achievement of a particular student.  But measuring this individual
achievement can be costly, even though the information it provides is
valuable to both parties.  It is typically more costly for the buyer to do
so than the school.  To minimise the costs to both parties, measurement
of quality is typically carried out where it can be done most cheaply.48
Schools are thus likely to measure educational attainment, for example
through examinations and the award of qualifications.
However, even if a school invests in establishing a good reputation,
examines its own students and awards qualifications, the buyer may be
no better off in terms of evaluating the true quality of the education
provided if the school is small and obscure.  Imagine how hard it
would be for an employer in Dunedin to obtain information about the
quality of a student educated on the East Coast if each school were able
to set its own examinations and issue its own qualifications.
It may therefore still be costly for the buyer to obtain information about
the school and the quality of the qualifications it provides.  One way for
schools to overcome this problem is to join together with other schools
to offer standardised qualifications.  This standardisation could also
involve the use of a common curriculum in order to economise on the
costs of developing materials.  The standardisation is a form of
branding which allows all the schools using the examination to utilise
the common brand.  Of course, it is not necessary for schools
themselves to develop a common examination system.  With a demand
for a common examination system, there is likely to be an incentive for
an external agency to develop and sell it to schools.  The advantage of
an external system of this kind is that it offers an independent measure
of educational attainment that is comparable across the range of
schools that use it.
Employers might establish their own tests of educational attainment.
They in fact often test potential employees on inherent characteristic
such as their aptitude for a job and psychological profile.   The results
of these tests are likely to be highly specific to the particular employer
and job, altogether general educational attainment has wider
applicability.  Employers are thus likely to measure only attributes that
are of particular interest to them, whereas both students and schools68
have an incentive to signal the totality of educational attainment.  As
discussed in Section 4.5.6, because the school and student know more
about the quality of education than the employer, they will tend to
provide such information.
Standardisation of measures of educational attainment has several
benefits.  In addition to economising on the costs of providing
information to buyers, standardisation can allow schools to take
advantage of economies of scale in the preparation of the curriculum
and can reduce the transaction costs to students of shifting between
schools.  The combination of these factors which all serve to reduce
transaction costs can affect the structure of the school as described
above.  Three basic forms are possible: an external organisation that
franchises or sells the curriculum to independently owned and
operated schools; a consortium of schools that have a common
philosophy of education or horizontal integration to form a chain of
schools.  The system of examinations for English as a second language
is an example of an external independent system of examinations that
is used as a common measure of English proficiency (see Box 25).
Box 25 - English as a Second Language
Qualifications in English by native speakers of other languages
are granted by private organisations.  TOEFL is an examination
developed by the University Testing Service in the US.  IELTS is
a competing examination offered by the University of Cambridge
Local Examination Syndicate.
The industry teaching English as a second language is not
vertically integrated.  While the examinations are set by these
organisations, there is a large industry that prepares materials for
students who wish to sit the examination.  Independent teachers
select among these materials or develop their own in preparing
students for the examination.  There is thus considerable
flexibility in teaching methods and the materials used in the
classroom.  Students pay for their tuition separately from the
examination fee, which is split between the local examiners and
the qualifying organisation.
5.2.2 Accreditation
A system of accreditation is an alternative to the use of standardised or
common qualifications.  It permits more flexibility than does the use of
a standard examination and yet facilitates compatibility.  An
accrediting agency assesses the educational programme of institutions
and provides an assurance of quality to both potential students and
employers.  Accreditation is commonly used in universities in the US
(see Box 26).  Accreditation is often used in conjunction with
qualifications.  Where the student has not yet received a qualification,
accreditation allows the cross-crediting of courses between institutions.69
Box 26 - AACSB
The International Association for Management Education is a
not-for-profit corporation of educational institutions,
corporations and other organizations devoted to the promotion
and improvement of higher education in business administration
and management.  Organized in 1916, AACSB is the premier
accrediting agency for bachelor’s, master’s and doctoral degree
programs in business administration and accounting.
As of March 1999, there are 364 accredited programs￿ 352 in the
U.S., seven in Canada, three in Europe and two in Mexico.
The AACSB membership consists of over 670 U.S.  educational
institutions, over 140 international educational institutions and
approximately 60 business, government and nonprofit
institutions.  AACSB U.S.  educational institutions annually
award over 85 percent of all the degrees awarded in business and
management education.  The AACSB accredited schools annually
award over 55 percent of all the degrees awarded in business and
management education.
AACSB also is the professional organisation for management
education.  In addition to its accreditation function, the
organisation conducts an extensive array of development
programs for faculty and administrators; engages in research and
survey projects on topics specific to the field of management
education; maintains relationships with disciplinary associations
and other groups; interacts with the corporate community on a
variety of projects and initiatives; and produces a wide variety of
publications and special reports on trends and issues within
management education.  AACSB also maintains close
relationships with its counterpart associations worldwide.
Source: http://www.aacsb.edu
5.3 Grouping
Schools are characterised by the grouping of students together in
various ways:
• classes are typically organised to teach students of similar
experience and ability together in peer groups, for example into
Standards or Forms;
• classes are often grouped in ways that are (presumably) intended
to improve educational achievement, for example in mixed ability
classes;
• teachers tend to provide classroom instruction to groups of
students;70
• schools are often differentiated on the basis of the socio-economic
status of students; and
• schools may specialise in providing educational services to a
particular sort of student, such as students at risk, or musically
talented students.
The question here is whether firms in the business sector operate in
similar ways, and whether these grouping tendencies are an inherent
characteristic of schooling that would continue in a less regulated
education environment.
5.3.1 Peer Groups
Parents are generally interested in obtaining the best possible education
for their children, and do not consider the possible effects on other
students.  Yet students affect each other, in both positive and negative
ways.  Less able students can learn from better students, so that having
good students in a classroom has a positive spillover benefit for the less
able, but in contrast, has little, if any, educational benefit to the better
students.  Poorly behaved, violent or disruptive students on the other
hand can harm learning.
These peer effects are an endogenous factor in determining the
outcome of the educational process.  A child’s interaction with other
students affects his or her own educational outcomes and those of the
other students.  This synergy can be both positive and negative, both
individually and in aggregate.  Individually, some students will be
better off because they are part of a class than they would be on their
own and other students will be worse off.  In aggregate, classes will
vary in the magnitude (and sign) of synergies between students.
These peer effects pervade service industries, where the service is
provided to a number of customers at once.  For example, airlines
typically reward customers who pay additional costs for business or
first class seats, or for ‘club’ membership fees with access to special
airport lounges.  While enhancing revenues for the airline, these
services partly reflect opportunities to ’network’ in business lounges
(ie, peer effects) which may increase customer loyalty.  However, the
differential pricing used by business to capture peer effects may not
provide a complete solution to the problem in the school sector on
equity grounds.
Similarly, a passenger’s enjoyment of a long flight will be affected by
attributes of passengers seated nearby.  Fellow passengers may provide
positive peer effects such as business contacts, stimulating
conversation, or a sense of elitism or fame by association.  They may
also provide negative peer effects such as noise (eg, crying babies),
body odour, or unwanted political or social commentary.  As in the
case of restaurants, airlines manage these peer effects by price
differentiation.  They create various classes of travel; F-class (first class),
B-class (business class) and Y-class (economy class), plus a number of
cut-price classes of tickets, typically allocated to seats such that cost is
successively lower as row number increases (and engine noise71
increases).  Thus, passengers are separated on the basis of their ability
to pay, which presumably sorts them in such a way as the flight’s peer
effects are maximised.  Like passengers are more likely to be seated
alongside like.  Experience indicates that willingness to pay is related to
certain externalities.  For example, families with babies are unlikely to
be flying business or first class.
Box 27 - Petit Lyon
The Petit Lyon restaurant in Wellington has three different
restaurants, each catering to different clientele and with different
prices and menus.  Downstairs is the Oyster Bar, which is casual,
although it does serve some business lunches.  It offers an a la
carte menu where mains cost $22, as well as a set price 3 course
menu for $50.  Upstairs is the Solo restaurant which is more
formal.  Mains on the a la carte menu are $35 and the 6 course set
menu is $65.  The Salon restaurant, also upstairs is more formal
still, and offers a 6 course set menu of New Zealand food for $150
and an exotic food menu for $250.
Airlines value differential pricing as a means of maximising peer
effects.  However, at the same time they would not wish to dissuade
frequent business flyers from travelling with them as a consequence of
price differentiation.  Frequent business travellers are likely to provide
high positive externalities and low negative externalities on a flight.
Thus, the airlines have devised upgrade programmes to optimise peer
effects through differential pricing, without dissuading business from
passengers that they want to keep.
While the examples from the food and transport sector may appear
trivial, they illustrate that the presence of peer effects (however
insubstantial) can be beneficial to patrons, and that businesses will
attempt to assist them to realise these benefits.
The responsiveness of educational organisations to peer effects is
highlighted in the university sector in the US.  Setting high fees for
prestigious graduate educational programmes serves a number of
purposes.  Such a strategy provides a signal of quality in a market
where quality can be hard to observe.  However, a problem is that it
may preclude very able students likely to contribute strong peer effects,
simply because they or their parents cannot afford the fees.  The
solution chosen by these graduate programmes is to provide
scholarships and/or fee waivers to those whose intellectual abilities
indicate are likely to provide synergistic interaction with other
students.49  Independent schools in New Zealand often adopt a similar
approach (see Box 33).72
Box 28 - Scots College
Scots College is an independent boys’ school in Wellington.  It
offers three scholarships for boys entering the Third Form.  The
scholarship is awarded strictly on academic ability in open
competition and amounts to two thirds of the annual fees.  The
school has found that part-payment of the fees by parents
encourages greater participation in school life by the scholars.
In addition, the school awards bursaries at the total discretion of
the headmaster.  These are generally awarded to boys who will
contribute positively to the school in some way, not necessarily
on academic merit.  There is no competition for these bursaries.
Source: Interview with Giles Moiser, Deputy Headmaster, 19 March 1999.
A school’s response to peer effects, paralleling that of businesses would
involve either:
• a single school setting different fees for different qualities of
education; or
• different schools attracting different types of students on the basis
of fee level.
The first of these options is likely to be less viable than the second
option.  However, certain schools in New Zealand currently implicitly
recognise and use differential pricing to realise the benefits of peer
effects by charging significant attendance fees (the second of the above
approaches).   The role of differential pricing of access to schooling
raises important equity considerations, in particular the implications
for students who would be denied access to schooling that would
enable them to achieve their full potential because of inadequate
resources.  Accordingly, for the bulk of schools, differential pricing (at
least in terms of fees paid by students and the families) is not a viable
option to address peer effects.
5.3.2 Classes
Students are typically grouped together to be taught, generally by topic
and (to varying extents) ability level.  This grouping arises because of
economies of scale in the process of teaching.  It can be efficient for a
single teacher to instruct a group of students at once.  Economies of
scale also affect the size of the school.  However, the intimate nature of
many personal services diminishes the effects of economies of scale,
since certain services are provided individually.  But some services,
such as exercise classes, can be offered to a number of people at once
(see Box 29).  Differential prices reflect the inherent economies of scale.
As discussed in Section 4.3, different types of tuition may be amenable
to classroom or individual teaching.73
Box 29 - Majestic Club on Willis
The Majestic Club is a gymnasium in Wellington that offers,
among other services, aerobics instruction.  Aerobics classes,
with about 15 participants, cost $98 for 10 trips of one hour each
or $13 per class.  Individual instruction is much dearer at $40 per
hour for a personal trainer.
5.3.3 Schools
In any market a wide variety of tastes and needs is catered for.  Motor
vehicle manufacturers produce saloon cars, utility trucks, motorcycles,
vans and trucks for example.  Each meets a different consumer need.
This characteristic of any competitive market is equally true of schools.
Different schools are likely to specialise in addressing different student
needs.  For example, sports academies could specialise in sports
coaching and dance schools teach dancing in addition to the regular
curriculum (see Box 30).  Students with particular needs are therefore
likely to attend the same specialist school.  Language, culture and
religion are particularly important in shaping the demand for
specialised schooling.
Box 30 - Raglan Surfing Academy
Raglan is a surfing town.  Raglan Area School has started New
Zealand’s first Surfing Academy and now has a dozen students.
After a typical high school day, academy students travel to Manu
Bay which is internationally recognised as having one of the
world’s best left-hand breaks.  The Academy offers both serious
surfing instruction and a full academic programme.  Teacher,
Dean Hishon, gives equal weight to academic and surfing
achievements.  He knows that if it were not for the surfing
options, some of the students would not even be in high school.
Source:  North and South March 1999, pp 22-23
Another factor which determines the grouping of students is that
parents often prefer to have their children attend a school where the
students are similar to their own children.  The result is stratification of
schools, often by socio-economic group or religion.  One reason for this
demand is that interaction with students from a similar background
and with similar experiences reduces the transaction costs of
relationships between students.50  Another is that there may be
externalities from attending these schools, such as the common culture
and values that are inculcated in the students or the ‘peer networks’
that can be useful in later life.  This is part of the peer effect discussed
above.  Parents will invest in their child’s education to the point that
additional cost outweighs any resulting scholastic benefit.  Thus,
parents’ schooling decisions will reflect both their:74
• perception of education’s benefit; and
• financial capabilities.51
The differentiation of goods and services by quality and price is
characteristic of all markets, from cars to clothing, food and medical
services.  Accordingly, in a less regulated market for schooling, these
parental choices are likely to lead to greater stratification than
currently.  Such an outcome, however, raises significant equity
implications which have been noted previously.
5.4 Multiple Services
A school provides several services to students and their parents
simultaneously.  For students it provides:
• academic instruction which is likely to be the principal service
provided by the school;
• additional services such as participation in sports, music or
drama;
• common values such as the school culture or respect for
democracy that are inculcated in students either indirectly
though interaction or directly though instruction;
• custodial services since students, particularly young students are
not in the charge of their parents while they are at school;
• social interaction with teachers and other students, the
development of personal relationships, and the ability to interact
effectively with others, and
• signalling which provides information to others about the
educational, social and financial status of the student and his or
her family.
The multiplicity of services provided by schools gives rise to a number
of issues.  The first is the question of measuring the performance of
schools when there are multiple objectives, and how this problem is
dealt with by firms.  The second issue is that the custodial services
provided by schools are an inherent part of the provision of schooling,
and occur more infrequently in the business environment.  How do
firms ensure that their customers or clients are safe on their premises?
Another issue is whether services are provided as part of the core
business of the school or whether they are contracted out to
independent service providers.
5.4.1 Performance Measurement
A particular problem facing schools is that they provide multiple
services simultaneously.  For example a school might offer academic
instruction and participation in sporting or cultural activities.  Students
and their parents may have vastly different objectives from one
another.  One student may wish to excel at sport, while another may
want to do well academically.  The diversity of services provided by75
schools gives rise to multiple objectives for teachers and the school.
Because schools offer a range of services, teachers are faced with
multiple objectives, which is a significant impediment to performance
contracting.  Jensen states that “multiple objectives is no objective”.52
The problem with multiple objectives is that each objective provides an
excuse for non-performance regarding all the other objectives, since the
objectives inevitably conflict.  For example, a person who acts on a
school’s board of trustees must simultaneously seek to do what is best
for the school and what is best for the public they represent.  It is
inevitable that these two objectives will come into conflict.  A typical
business solution is to separate these objectives so that a person,
division or organisation is charged with achieving a single objective.
This solution is well illustrated in the restructuring of New Zealand
government departments as state-owned enterprises.  Trading,
regulatory, educational, social, ecological, and funding functions were
separated so that each organisation could be evaluated as to whether it
achieved its objective.
Separating these functions is difficult, since together they comprise
what society perceives as education.  This is not to say that these
functions cannot be separated.  For example, correspondence schools
illustrate that custodial and academic functions are separable.
However, a typical school combines these functions.  Milgrom, in a
seminar presentation of his academic work on optimal contracting
provides the following business example.53
Box 31 - Milgrom’s Kitchen
Milgrom was having an Italian kitchen installed in his home.  He
sought to bring his skills to bear as an expert in efficient
contracting in the way he structured the contract between
himself and the kitchen installer.  There were two things
Milgrom was interested in; the quality of the kitchen, and the
time the installation took.  Milgrom sought to incentivise the
installer to complete the kitchen as fast as possible, so as to
minimise disruption to his household.  He also wanted to make
sure the installation would last and that the cabinets would not
fall off the wall.  But the problem he faced was that one objective
was measurable and the other was not.  The time the installation
took to complete could be measured, but quality could not.
Contracting on the measurable objective alone would have led
the installer to finish the installation work within the time
allotted, but may also have led to a sacrifice in quality.  He
decided to contract on performance of neither attribute.
Focussing on the ‘wrong’ objectives can distort incentives.  In 19th
century England and Wales, teachers received government grants on
the basis of an inspector’s examination of the students on strictly set
down criteria.  While the objective was to ensure the accountability of
schools for the use of public funds, teachers had incentives to drill76
students only in what was examinable, rather than instruct them more
widely.54
The implication for schooling is that if one outcome is measurable and
another is not, then it is problematic to contract on the measurable
outcomes alone, as it may lead to non-measurable outcomes being
sacrificed.  For example, if teachers were incentivised on the basis of
increases in measurable mathematics skills, then there is a possibility
that teachers may concentrate on developing these testable skills to the
exclusion of less-testable skills.  A business solution to this problem
would be the contracting of mathematics education to a single
educational specialist organisation, assigning that organisation a single
objective, and holding it accountable for achieving that objective.  The
school would then have the task of making sure overall objectives are
achieved.
5.4.2 Safety and Security
An inherent part of formal schooling is the passing over of temporary
custody of children by parents to the teachers and administrators of a
school.  This implies two things.  First, it implies that the school will
respond to the trust placed in it by taking reasonable steps to ensure
the physical safety of the children.
Second, the custodial function also implies that the school will take
steps to ensure that the child remains at the school when the parent
expects it to be there.
The passing over of temporary custody of children is not unique to
schooling.  Parents will often leave children at an ice rink or movie
theatre during school holidays, weekends or after school, in the
expectation that safety and security is an inherent feature of the
entertainment provided by the venue.  This is essentially the same as
parents’ expectations regarding schooling.  A significant point of
difference between entertainment establishments and schools is that
entertainment establishments do not have an explicit responsibility to
keep the child on the premises.  For example, if children wish to leave
an amusement park, they simply do so.
This contrasts with a school which has the responsibility of ensuring
not only that children do not leave before the end of the school day, but
also that in the absence of an excuse, they arrive at school after leaving
home in the morning.  Schools could, as part of their contract with
parents, provide truancy services that ensured that students attended
the school.  This feature of schooling arises because education at
primary and to a lesser extent at secondary levels, involves children
who cannot be relied upon to make decisions in their own long term
interest.  Parents are expected to make decisions on their behalf, and in
fact children are legally prevented from entering into contracts (except
for certain necessities such as food) for this reason.
There are few counterparts to the custodial nature of schools in
business, where clients are prevented from disengaging from the
service provision contracted for.  Indeed, all business relies on77
voluntary exchange.  Perhaps the closest analogy is in the provision of
care for the senile elderly,  overseas countries, where residents enjoy
custodial care.  Self-binding contracts are rare in business, although
some contracts impose penalties if clients withdraw.  For example
clients who pay subscriptions to a gymnasium and then do not attend,
forgo the money.  Infrequent attendance at a school may cause the
school to suspend the child permanently which is a sanction akin to a
self-binding contract, although the costs of breach fall mainly on the
parents.
5.4.3 Service Provision
Schools are likely to provide services complementary to their principal
teaching function such as careers advice, health care and school
cafeterias.  Schools could also offer non-core teaching activities (such as
ballet or guitar lessons) in this way.
A range of organisational forms is likely to be used for these activities.
Some could be contracted out to providers who leased space and
charged students separately for the use of their services.  This response
is common in organisations such as clubs which contract out services
such as catering.  Members pay fees to the club for the main activity
(for example golf) but pay separately for the ancillary activities (for
example the bar).
An alternative arrangement would be if the club carried out its own
catering.  The principal disadvantages of in-house provision compared
with the contracting out option are that costs might be higher and the
level and quality of service lower.  On the other hand the costs of
monitoring quality may be lower.
The choice of in-house provision of services versus contracting out is an
important decision in all businesses.  It occurs for example in the
provision of medical services where facilities are leased to specialists
(see Box 41).  Perhaps the most obvious dichotomy is the department
store and the mall.  A department store provides a range of services
within a single ownership structure which might lease or own the
premises, while a mall owner leases sites to independent store owners
but exercises some choice in determining a desirable mix among them.
The question for schools is whether they would operate more like a
department store or a mall.  In other words could school simply consist
of an owner of the land and buildings, with independent teachers
contracted to provide instruction in a range of subject areas?78
Box 32 - Ascot Integrated Hospital
Ascot Integrated Hospital is a for-profit company that leases its
facilities to surgeons and consultants who provide a range of
services to patients.  The patients pay the surgeons directly for
their services, but also for any additional hospital services that
they use.  The hospital also leases space to other tenants, such as
the pharmacy.  The core business of the hospital is thus the
provision of facilities to medical practitioners and other service
providers and accommodation and nursing care to patients.
A number of factors are likely to influence the choice of in-house
provision and contracting out.  The first is related to information; who
monitors performance and how it is measured.  The second question is
who bears the benefits of good performance and the costs of poor
performance.  The third issue is how to ensure the commitment of the
parties to deliver.  Finally transaction costs (which arise, of course, with
issues such as information) are important.
The core services of schools, such as teaching the basic curriculum
(which might differ between schools as they cater to differing student
needs) are likely to be provided in-house.  Teachers of these subjects
would be employees or contracted to the school.  In contrast, non-core
services could be provided to students by independent teachers who
simply leased the school facilities and contracted directly with students
and their parents.
This pattern is likely in the first place because of the transaction costs of
co-ordination and specialisation discussed in Section 4.3.  Co-
ordination of core subjects in a curriculum is carried out more easily
and cheaply in house than through individual service providers
contracting with parents.  In addition, the quality of the services
provided by the school as a whole is likely to be monitored by
prospective students and their employers on these core services, rather
than on ancillary areas of instruction.  The rewards of providing good
quality education in these areas are likely to fall on the school as a
whole, which has an incentive to invest in activities such as establishing
a good reputation and in branding to signal its commitment to high
performance.
In contrast, ancillary services are likely to be provided directly to
students by service providers.  These services are likely to be those that
do not require high levels of co-ordination with the core curriculum,
and where students and their parents can readily monitor quality.
Prospective clients are likely to select providers of these extra-
curricular activities on the basis of their individual reputations.  The
rewards of good performance fall on the individual provider, but some
of the penalties of poor performance fall on the school, which thus has
some incentive to monitor them.79
The arrangements that schools make for providing services to students
are thus likely to vary between those that are provided in-house by the
school and those that are provided by contractors who lease school
facilities.  This pattern of provision already occurs within schools, for
example where music teachers offer specialist tuition to students using
school premises and are paid directly by parents.  Without a specified
curriculum or the regulation of employment relations between teachers
and schools, a variety of arrangements is likely to arise to meet the
demand for a diverse range of services provided through schools.
5.5 Multiple Use
Schools are costly to build.  Yet, in New Zealand they are generally
only used for teaching from 8:30 to 3:30, five days a week, thirty-two
weeks or so a year.  It would appear that capital investment in a
school’s land and buildings is under-utilised.  Businesses with similar
resource usage patterns through time are be likely to seek to use their
assets more effectively through:
• running the business for multiple shifts;
• encouraging peak-period customers to move patronage to off-
peak times through time-of day/week/year pricing; and
• providing other services to new customer groups during times
when the main customer group is not using the resources.
Responses such as this which can be observed in the school sector
include the use of schools in the summer as youth hostels or camping
grounds, running night classes or summer schools, letting school halls
to private groups such as churches or aerobics class operators (see Box
33).
Box 33 - The Use of School Facilities for the Millennium
In addition to the Gisborne City Council’s plans to turn much of
its free land and parks into camp grounds to accommodate the
influx of tourists expected in the region over New Year 1999,
Lytton High School will hire out its main playing field to a
caravanning club.  Providing that Council grants resource
consent, the school will receive rental revenue over the period
from the group.  Other schools in the region are expected to
follow suit.
5.6 Location
Schooling generally occurs within reasonably close proximity of a
child’s home.  Boarding schools would be the exception, where a
student’s home may be in a different town, province or country from
the school.  Such an option is costly to the student and parents, both in
financial and non-financial terms.   Even where a student lives in the
same region as the school they attend, the location of a child’s home,80
relative to the school’s location, gives rise to costs borne by parent and
child.   Examples of these costs include the obvious time and other costs
of commuting, along with additional costs such as the relative inability
to participate in extra-curricular activities, and the relative inability to
feel part of the community to which other students belong.  If all
schools are perceived as equal by parents, then minimising these costs
implies attending the closest school, and locating the child’s home as
close to the school as wealth and non-educational personal preferences
allow.
Observation indicates that not all parents view all schools as equal,
since not all children attend their closest school.  Parents may send
their children to a school other than the closest school if they consider
that, overall, it has more desirable qualities, including positive peer
effects, ancillary services (such as religious instruction or emphasis on
arts or sports) and the type and quality of education that is provided.
In fact, a potentially measurable quality indicator for a school is the
proportion of parents voluntarily incurring additional costs to attend
that school.  For instance, if 50 percent of children could attend a school
closer to their home, but choose not to, then we can infer that parents
prefer this particular school.55
Willingness to have children commuting long distances clearly has
some practical limits, the more so the younger a child.56  However, the
location of a child’s chosen school is not the only location decision that
a parent makes.  The parent can also move the family home.  As in the
case of commuting, this decision gives rise to additional costs.  The
willingness for parents to locate their home close to a preferred school
is again another potentially measurable quality indicator for a school.
For instance, if a school is so desirable that dwellings nearby are highly
sought-after, this would be reflected in real estate prices, relative to the
cost of similar dwellings that are not as close to the preferred school.
Of course, the willingness of parents to bear this cost has practical
limits also.  Parents will trade off the cost of greater commuting times
with the increased cost of real estate in closer proximity to the school.
It is self-regulating; if real estate costs get ‘too high’, parents will move
further away, substituting commuting costs for real estate holding (or
renting) costs.  Real estate prices will fall as a consequence of the
reduced demand.
Relocating the family home for educational reasons is clearly costly.
These costs can be considerable where the livelihood of family
members is integrally related to the location of their home.  An obvious
example is that of a farming family, where the family home is also the
family livelihood.  Changing one’s livelihood to move close to a
preferred school for one’s children is likely to be prohibitively costly.
In the case of remote, high-country properties, for example, even
commuting to the nearest school may be prohibitively costly, let alone
to preferred schools beyond the closest one.  Where the cost of
relocating the home is very high, parents will seek alternatives such as
home schooling, correspondence schools, and boarding schools.
Decisions regarding the location of the family home relative to the
location of other organisations is clearly a common problem.  People81
choose to be close to their place of work, their place of worship, ethnic
centres, their preferred recreational pursuit, shops, and commuter lines.
These are preferences, to a greater or lesser degree that reflect personal
choice and would occur with regard to school in the absence of
government regulation of the location of schools.
Businesses respond to the demand for their services in their decisions
to locate, and often take into account sophisticated demographic
analyses of the market.  Business are thus most likely to site themselves
where there is a sufficiently high demand for them to make the
investment in physical facilities worthwhile.  However, where demand
is sparse and does not justify significant investment in premises, plant
and equipment, often solutions can be devised that serve the market at
a lesser cost.  Most of these alternatives revolve around increasing use
of technology that decouples location from provision of service.
Banking is an obvious example (see Box 34 and Box 35).  Banking is
seldom a large enough part of life that people locate their homes with
direct reference to the availability of banking services.  People who live
in locations where population density is low are likely to face large
commutes to undertake banking services.  One solution is for banking
systems to allow remote transactions.  They will do it as long as the
benefit (either direct or indirect) is greater than the overall cost of
providing the service.82
Box 34 - Tairua
Tairua is a small a coastal town on the Coromandel Peninsula
near Auckland.  The town does not count a bank among its
services, due to its small population, surrounding low
population density and its population seasonality.  However, it
does have a number of high volume cash businesses such as the
petrol station.  The station’s electronic funds transfer machine
allows it to ‘bank’ sale proceeds at point of sale, and to provide
cash withdrawal services to customers.  As the proportion of
patrons willing to pay by means of electronic transfer increases,
the need to deposit the station’s revenue diminishes.  The service
station will of course take in cash.  However, because there is no
bank in the town, many people rely on the service stations till as
a means of withdrawing money from their bank account.  The
station manager provides people with cash and debits their
account for the amount withdrawn, and the bank credits the
station’s account.57  The station manager may charge a fee for
this service, depending on the demand for withdrawals, relative
to his or her need to deposit cash efficiently.
Box 35 - The Bank That Never Closes
BankDirect, ASB’s Internet and telephone-based subsidiary
opened its virtual doors for the first time in October 1997.  With
no branches and only 30 staff, BankDirect received 40,000 phone
calls and over 475,000 hits to its web-site in the first 6 months of
operation.  While this may well be a function of its widely
advertised lower bank charges, the launch of New Zealand’s
only virtual bank signalled a new direction in banking services.
One year after BankDirect entered the market, almost every other
bank in the country was offering some form of Internet banking.
BankDirect offers a full range of banking services out of its
single-floor premises in Auckland’s Ponsonby.  Most customers
are high users of technology and have Internet access at home or
at work.  For this market, lack of physical branches is not a cause
for concern or anxiety.
Source:  Young, C.  (1998)’Finalist Case Study’  NZ Marketing 26 October:36.
In a similar manner, technology such as telephone, fax and radio have
been used to decouple the location of home and work (see Box 36).  The
computer industry is one industry at the forefront of ‘tele-commuting’
or working from home.  This technology allows the separation of
teacher and student, and its effect is likely to be strengthened by future
developments.  For example, teleconferencing and the internet allow
teachers to transmit ideas through media other than the written and
spoken word (see Box 37 and Box 38).83
Box 36 - Whitefish/Kalispell
The Whitefish/Kalispell area of Montana, near Glacier National
Park, is close to some of the most beautiful scenery in the world.
However, employment opportunities have been limited in this
area.  Until recently.  A number of computer programming
companies, and computer software and hardware mail-order
companies have located in the Whitefish/Kalispell area.   These
companies reason that they will be able to hire employees at a
lower cost if they can provide them with a higher quality of life
through low smog, small commuting times, and tremendous
recreational activities nearby.  The nature of these businesses is
that through reliance on technology they can be located without
reference to their customers.  For example, ‘800’ numbers can be
answered anywhere in the United States.  Shipping can be
electronically arranged to originate directly from the supplier’s
warehouse to the customer.
Box 37 - School of the Air
Alice Springs School of the Air is a correspondence school for
primary school aged children, that utilises various
communications technologies to have daily contact with
students, supervisors and teachers.  Many of the students live on
cattle stations, while a significant number come from Aboriginal
communities, camel farms, national parks, mining camps,
mission stations or remote police stations.  The broadcast area is
1.3 million square kilometres.  In addition, telecommunications
technologies (phone, fax and computers) represent invaluable
resources.  Electronic mail has become a significant tool in
distributing and receiving course work.
Box 38 - Long Distance Degrees
There are many degrees and diplomas that can now be obtained
over the Internet or by distance learning.  While some may be of
questionable quality, there are many reputable universities such
as MIT, University of Pennsylvania, Harvard, Cornell, Brown
and Stanford Universities offering distance-independent
educational programmes and making use of technology in
offering a geographically diverse student body a wide range of
courses.  Students, in addition to using traditional delivery
mechanisms such as books and video tapes, can participate in
classes through interactive talkback systems, video conferencing,
satellite TV and communicate with faculty and staff by phone or
electronic mail.  In other situations, lectures may be recorded and
made available along with course materials shortly after the class
using web-based multimedia technology.84
The extent to which technology will decouple the location of teachers
and students is yet to be seen.  Certainly, the loss of peer learning
effects is an impediment to such separation becoming widespread.
There are also advantages to face-to-face teaching such as the
development of personal relationships that cannot be replicated by
technology.  However, such costs may be lower than the costs of
relocating the family home, selling the family’s livelihood, or sending a
child to a boarding school.
In these cases, technology may provide a solution to the problem of
location.  This is more likely for older students.  In fact, internet-
delivered courses are already being provided by universities.  Distance-
learning Masters of Business Administration have been provided for
many years.
While technology is likely to increasingly provide alternatives for older
school children, home schooling by parents often using distance
learning materials is a potential alternative for younger children to the
costs of relocation or commuting.  A business analogy is provided by
electricity reticulation (see Box 39).  Where the cost of putting an
electricity line into a rural home is high and is borne by the home
owner, the owner is likely to seek alternatives such as solar panels,
generators, water wheels or wood stoves
 Box 39 - Waiheke Island
Waiheke Island in the Hauraki Gulf has had mains electricity for
many years, provided from the North Island electricity grid via a
submerged cable.  The fully allocated cost of electricity via that
cable was in the vicinity of 40c per unit, which was much higher
than the cost per unit charged at the time.  This had the following
effects at the margin, relative to what would have occurred in the
absence of cross-subsidisation:
• increased population of Waiheke Island,
• increased value of Waiheke real estate,
• increased demand for mains electricity, thus
• accelerating the capital requirements for further uneconomic
investment in the cable, and
• decreasing the use of solar panels, wood-fired heating, and
generators.
Other electricity consumers were compelled to subsidise a
lifestyle choice, with resulting distortions not just in the
electricity market.
Because school location and family location decisions affect one
another, homogeneity of a school’s student body can be increased in a
particular area over time.  Seattle, Washington, provides an example in
Box 40.85
Box 40 - Mercer Island
The existence of Jewish schools, synagogue and Jewish
community centres has attracted a Jewish community to settle on
Mercer Island.  The Jewish community has in turn encouraged
the establishment of Jewish organisations on the island.  At the
margin, movements on and off the island serve to reinforce this
separating equilibrium over time.  Mercer Island’s population is
currently 25 percent Jewish.  Because of the Jewish community’s
focus on education, both the private and public schools on
Mercer Island are of high quality and are highly regarded.  This
has the effect of attracting non-Jewish families that value
education similarly.  As a consequence, the peer effects of
similarly motivated students in the same classroom increases the
perceived quality of Mercer Island schools, attracting more
families for whom education is important.  Some of the resulting
demand for Mercer Island’s schools has fuelled its relatively high
real estate values.  The effect has been an increase in the
homogeneity of Seattle area classrooms.  Critics of this process
point to the fact that while this homogeneity in Mercer Island
classrooms is clearly of educational benefit to Mercer Island
students, the homogeneity engendered in non-Mercer Island
classrooms is potentially detrimental to learning for non-Mercer
Island students.
A particular issue related to the location of schools is the number of
schools that arise in a metropolitan region.  With  significant economies
of scale in schooling why doesn’t one single school develop in each
metropolitan centre?  While the existence of economies of scale serve to
increase the size of a school, other factors obviously serve to reduce
school size.  In the first place, while returns to scale exist, they become
exhausted beyond a certain size.  Second, the costs of the majority of a
city’s school-age population commuting to a single location at the same
time of day would be substantial.58  Third, having a number of different
schools in the same metropolitan area serves to provide benchmarks
and means of useful comparisons regarding quality.  Fourth, it also
serves to facilitate specialisation that increase homogeneity in the
classroom, and therefore enhance peer effects.
The optimal number of schools in a metropolitan area will be
determined by the opposing effects of increasing economies of scale,
and (a) increasing commuting costs and (b) decreasing opportunities
for choice and comparison.  This is not substantially different from the
forces that determine how many supermarkets are provided in a
metropolitan centre.  More than one supermarket is clearly efficient,
despite the obvious economies of scale in retailing food and household
items.  Multiple supermarkets reduces shoppers’ commuting time,
allow different stores to service clientele with different preferences, and
increase the ability to compare both price and quality.
It is possible that schools would develop multiple campuses in
response to demand.  A single school with multiple campuses would86
allow it to economise on administration costs and the costs associated
with developing its unique ‘brand’ such as its teaching approach,
school culture and curriculum.  The expansion of a school to multiple
campuses is likely if a successful school faces a demand that it cannot
meet with its existing facilities; where there are greater rewards from
expansion than from simply increasing its prices and where the quality
of the services proved by the school can be duplicated effectively in
another location.
5.7 Conclusion
Just as transaction costs explain how schools are structured, they also
explain how schools behave in the market.  Transaction costs underlie a
number of the behavioural characteristics of schools, such as the use of
compatible qualifications, the grouping of students, the provision of
multiple services within the school, the multiple uses to which school
facilities can be put and the location of schools.  Other factors that are
important include economies of scale and economies of scope.
The business analogies explored in Chapter 5 suggest a number of
inherent behavioural features of schooling and education.  Many of
these characteristics are reflected in the existing practices of schools,
suggesting that they are inherent characteristics that arise from the
nature of educational services.
Schools would tend to standardise their qualifications and make them
compatible.  The tendency of students to move between schools is
made easier if schools adopt compatible qualifications that reflect an
agreed standard of achievement.  A common, standardised system of
measuring educational quality can promote interaction between
schools by providing information on the educational achievement of
the student and reducing the transaction costs of shifting students
between schools.  It can also allow schools to take advantage of
economies of scale in the preparation of the curriculum.  Three basic
forms are possible: an external organisation that franchises or sells the
curriculum to independently owned and operated schools; a
consortium of schools that have a common philosophy of education or
horizontal integration to form a chain of schools.
Schools are likely to group students together for instruction, to take
advantage of economies of scale where teaching a number of students
at once is effective.  In other circumstances, for example, piano
teaching, one-on-one teaching is more appropriate, but the costs per
student are likely to be higher.  Groupings of clients are common in
other businesses, where individual attention often involves higher
costs.
Schools might try to take advantage of the fact that students learn from
one another.  Students affect each other, so that good students can
improve the learning of less able students, thus improving the overall
observed quality of the school.  Schools currently take advantage of
these positive peer effects by offering scholarships to bright students
and these or similar practices could be expected to continue.  These87
peer effects pervade service industries, which typically manage them
through differential pricing.
Schools are likely to cater for a diversity of student needs by
specialising in certain subjects or approaches to education.  Students
have a wide variety of tastes and needs.  Different schools will
specialise in meeting different needs, from schools specialising in
surfing to drama.  Language, culture and religion are particularly
important in shaping the demand for specialised schooling.  Socio-
economic factors may also be important, with parents likely to select
schools where students are similar to their own children.  The
differentiation of goods and services by type, quality and price is a
defining characteristics of all markets, from cars to clothing.
Schools would provide a safe environment and custodial services for
children.  An inherent part of schooling is the passing over of
temporary custody of children by parents to the school.  The school
would respond by taking steps to ensure the safety of the children and
to ensure their continued presence there during school hours.  The
explicit custodial care of children is not common in business outside
the education sector, since children can leave places such as cinemas
voluntarily.  However, businesses that cater to children will try to
ensure their safety and security because of the intrinsic importance of
doing so as well as the severe negative impact on the demand for their
services if accidents occur.
School facilities might be used more intensively.  The capital assets of
schools, such as land and buildings, can be costly.  This is a typical
feature of many businesses, which respond for example by making
more intensive use of their facilities by running multiple shifts or by
leasing facilities.  To the extent that school facilities are not highly
specialised (ie they are not highly asset specific), which will vary
among schools by location and specialisation, premises could be leased
and fitted out for schools in the same way as they are for other
businesses.
Schools might be used to provide multiple services.  The provision of
academic instruction is complementary to many other activities
directed at children and young people.  Schools could offer services in
addition to the core provision of education.  For example, they could
offer health care or driving instruction.  These services could be
provided simply as part of the overall package of services, or they
could be provided under contract by specialists who leased facilities
from the school.  The leasing of facilities for the provision of
complementary services is common in business, for example in
shopping malls.
The location of schools is likely to reflect changes in technology.
Schools are generally located close to a child’s home.  Like other
businesses, schools are likely to site themselves close to the demand for
their services, but demand at that location must be sufficient to justify
the provision of a service.  Technology is likely to become ever more
important in delivering education since it lowers the cost of separating88
location from the provision of services.  Technology is increasingly
being relied on to provide services in small or remote communities.
Overall, schools are likely to function in much the same way as other
businesses.  However, there are two fundamental features of education
that make the provision of education different from other services.
The first is the complexity of the educational process that makes it
difficult to assess educational outcomes.  One effect of this
characteristic is that it is difficult to assess what students have learned.
This is a particular problem when students shift between schools and
for potential employers.  The response is a typical characteristic of
schooling – the development of compatible qualifications that provide
information (however imperfectly) about educational attainment.  This
activity has few counterparts in business.  Another effect is that it is
difficult to separate the contribution made by the school to the
education of the student (the value-added).  One response to this is the
use of the examination system to signal (albeit imperfectly) school
quality, as discussed in Section 4.
Another characteristic of education at primary and secondary school
level is that it involves children.  Parents typically make decisions on
behalf of their children in education as they do in health and nutrition,
because young children are not capable of making them.  Clearly, this
effect lessens as children get older.  Schools usually involve the
attendance of students for instruction (although children can be
educated at home by their parents or through distance learning).  The
school thus acts in loco parentis and has effective custody of the
children.  Parents who expect a school to teach their children will also
expect it to take steps to ensure that once at school, students stay for
instruction.  Schools thus provide security and truancy services that
have no apparent counterpart in the business world.89
6 Conclusion
The government currently strongly influences education in New
Zealand.  As is the case in most other countries, education is
compulsory.  Education is free if students attend state schools, but
students at integrated and independent schools are subsidised.  State
schools dominate the sector, with only 3.5 percent of students attending
independent schools.  State schools are regulated in most aspects of
their operations such as governance arrangements, hours of operation
and employment of teachers.  Independent schools are lightly
regulated, but must provide services similar to state schools in order to
receive government funding.  The schools sector is thus characterised
by great similarity in their operations and the use of a common
curriculum framework and examination system.
However, the observed characteristics of schools do not necessarily
imply that they are an inherent feature of education.  For example, the
fact that most private schools are non-profit does not necessarily mean
that schools are inherently non-profit.  It might simply be the case that
government policies, such as tax arrangements that encourage
donations, might favour this form of organisation.
This report attempts to identify the inherent features of education and
schooling that make schools similar to, or different from, other
activities.  The observed structure and behaviour of schools explicitly
and implicitly reflects the influence of government policies.  This report
identifies the intrinsic features of education and of schooling in order to
examine how the affect the way that schools might be structured and
how they might function.  It then sees how other businesses with
similar features respond to them in the way they are structured or the
way they perform.
Education is a service whose inherent characteristics affect how schools
are organised and how they function.  The principal features of
education are that:
• it is an investment which involves a current cost and a future
and uncertain benefit;
• it is a complex process that depends not only on the ability and
past education of the student but also on the quality of teaching;
• the needs of students are heterogeneous, and each student has
different needs and capabilities;
• the quality of the service is hard to assess before it is used and
the effects of poor teaching may only become apparent after
some years;
• education is cumulative and sequential, so that what can be
learned depends on what has been learned before; and
• education at the primary and secondary level involves children,
whose parents act on their behalf in choosing to educate them;90
These characteristics of educational services share many common
features with other professional services such as health care or legal
services.  For example health care is an investment that can improve the
length and quality of life; the benefits of health care depend not only on
the quality of the care, but also on the patient; the needs of patients are
diverse; the quality of the service is hard to assess before use; health
status often depends of past lifestyle decisions and activities and not all
patients (such as those who are incapacitated) are capable of making
their own decisions about the care they need.
Schools have certain inherent features that arise from the nature of the
educational services they provide.  Schools are a typical organisational
form for providing educational services.  They typically:
• involve a teacher or teachers with a number of students;
• involve long term relationships between students, staff and the
school;
• offer qualifications and examinations;
• offer a range of subjects of instruction;
• divide students into various categories; and
• offer other services in addition to education.
The way that schools are structured and function arises from the
inherent characteristics of education.  They give rise to transaction costs
in obtaining information, in negotiation and in monitoring contracts to
which schools respond through their structure and performance.
Transaction costs underlie the organisational form of schools in the
same way that they determine the structure of firms.  Schools
economise on the costs of co-ordinating all the inputs required to
produce educational services, such as teachers and materials, and they
also take advantage of specialisation.  Schools therefore typically
involve one or more teachers and a number of students.
Transaction costs also arise in determining the quality of the
educational outcomes of schooling.  Education is a complex process – it
depends both on the student as an input as well as on the process of
schooling itself.  Measuring the quality of schooling is difficult and
costly because it is hard to observe the ability of students and the
quality of their effort and to separate these effects from the value added
by the school.  It is costly not only for the sellers, but also for the
buyers.  In addition, buyers and sellers have different information
about the factors that affect educational outcomes.  For example,
schools know more about the quality of their educational services they
provide than do parents.
These measurement issues and the transaction costs they generate are a
fundamental feature of education that determines a range of responses
by schools in their structure and performance.  Similar issues arise in
the business sector and give rise to analogous responses.91
Variation in factors exogenous to the schooling process give rise to an
information asymmetry where parents know more about their child’s
intellectual endowment and prior educational experience than the
school or teachers do (see Figure 6).  When students move between
schools the students and the previous school know more about the
student’s educational achievement than does the new school.  This
information asymmetry is dealt with in business through pre-testing.
Schools respond to this information asymmetry by providing measures
of student achievement that are comparable between schools and
across students, typically through systems of qualifications and
examinations.  They also have the advantage that they provide a signal
of quality as discussed below.  It is noteworthy that this characteristic
of schools has few direct parallels outside education.  For students who
move between schools, the use of common systems of examinations
and curricula allow the new school to assess the educational
background of the new student.  In cases where students routinely
graduate from one school to another at a higher level, vertical
integration could further facilitate movement between them.
Figure 6 - Input Variation and Responses
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Variation in factors endogenous to the schooling process gives rise to
an information asymmetry in the opposite direction as shown in Figure
7.  The school is likely to know more about its quality than potential
students and their parents.  Yet schools have strong incentives to
provide potential students and their parents with information about
the quality of the services they provide.  They will use a range of
measures in order to do so.  This form of information asymmetry is
very common in business.
Business responses address this measurement issue through
development of reputation and branding, chains, franchises, long-run
relationships and/or repeat business.  All of these responses already
occur in the school sector, and would be likely to strengthen in the
absence of sector-specific government involvement.  Systems of
qualifications are also used to provide information about the quality of
educational services.  Other business responses, such as guarantees are
less likely to be applicable, given the nature of education, but are likely
to be limited to instances where success or failure is clearly identifiable,92
such as driving tests.  Another business solution to this type of
information asymmetry involves the customer visiting, or participating
in, the production process.  In a similar way, parental involvement in
the educational process will serve to mitigate information asymmetry
regarding schooling process quality.  Rating schemes, franchises or
industry associations are other business responses to similar
information asymmetries.  While uncommon in schooling, such
responses are potentially applicable means of reducing information
asymmetry.  Even information asymmetry between a teacher and
school regarding the teacher’s quality is addressed in a manner similar
to that of the asymmetry between the school and the parent.
Variation in educational output as a result of exogenous and
endogenous factors is central to the difficulties in evaluating
performance of schools and teachers (see Figure 8).  The multi-
dimensional aspect of educational outcomes is central to this difficulty.
A business response to multiple outcomes is to provide a business with
a single objective and separate out other objectives into other
organisations.  This is, of course, not possible if the multiple objectives
and outcomes are integrally related, as would appear to be the case
with schooling.
Other features of education are also important in determining the
structure and performance of schools.  The positive benefits of the
presence of others on students can lead to differential pricing and the
use of scholarships and bursaries to attract more able students or those
who would benefit the school in other ways.  The transaction costs of
moving between schools will lead to the adoption of comparable
measures of student achievement either through the use of common
systems of examinations and qualifications or through the use of
accreditation systems.  Economies of scale lead to the teaching of
students in classes, rather than individual instruction.  Tradeoffs
between economies of scale and transport costs lead to decisions about
the optimal location of schools.  Schooling produces both multiple
services and spillover effects.  This multiplicity of services gives rise to
problems in prioritising school objectives and in measuring
performance relative to those objectives.  The custodial nature of
schooling requires mechanisms to ensure the safety and security of
students.93
Figure 7 - Process Variation and Responses
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Figure 8 - Output Variation and Responses
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Drawing parallels and distinctions between business and schools has
the capacity to provide useful insights and to expand the set of
potential solutions to contracting and evaluation problems inherent in
schooling.  This report can also be seen as a step toward useful
dialogue between business and the school sector, using a common
language and framework.  While schools have a number of unique,
inherent attributes, there are very few aspects of schooling that in
isolation do not have their counterpart in business.  The most
important of these are the use of systems for measuring educational
attainment, most commonly examinations and assessment, and the
custodial nature of schools.
It is impossible to know exactly what a school system might look like in
the absence of the effects of government involvement.  But it is
important to describe how such a system might function when
considering any changes to government policy, since the parameters of
government intervention can have a significant impact on the
incentives of all those involved and thus on the how schools are
organised and function.  Based on the business analogies described in
this report, it is likely that:
• a diversity of organisational forms of schools would arise, with
different forms of ownership, governance and objectives;95
• the organisational form would change and evolve over time as
an efficient and effective mechanism for providing educational
services;
• schools would specialise in addressing the diverse needs of
students, providing a range of courses, teaching approaches,
educational quality and price;
• schools would use a range of means for providing information
on their educational services; including the measurement of the
educational achievements of students; and
• schools would continue to provide custodial services to ensure
that students at school remained for instruction.
Overall, it is likely that schools would function much like other
businesses whose products and services have characteristics similar to
education.  However, the difficulty of measuring the quality of
educational services they provide and the custody of children
distinguishes education and schooling from other services, and gives
rise to systems for measuring educational achievement and ensuring
that students attend and remain at school.96
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